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FEDERALISM, PRECLEARANCE, AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
ELLEN

D. KATZ*

r OPEZ v. Monterey County' is an odd decision. Justice O'Connor's maL-djority opinion easily upholds the constitutionality of a broad construction of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in language reminiscent
of the Warren Court. Acknowledging the "substantial 'federalism costs"'
resulting from the VRA's "federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and
local policymaking,"12 Lopez recognizes that the Reconstruction Amendments "contemplate" this encroachment into realms "traditionally reserved to the States."3 Justice O'Connor affirms as constitutionally
permissible the infringement that the section 5 preclearance process "by
its nature" effects on state sovereignty, 4 and applies section 5 broadly,
holding the statute applicable to a county's nondiscretionary implementation of state law. This holding, Justice O'Connor insists, "adds5 nothing of
"
constitutional moment to the burdens that the Act imposes.
Decided in 1999, Lopez stands in tension not only with a series of
Rehnquist Court decisions circumscribing congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, 6 but also with two other opinions
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. Yale 1991;J.D.
Yale 1994. Thanks to Evan Caminker, Heather Gerken, Daniel Halberstam, Don

Herzog, Rick Hills, Ronald Mann and Richard Primus for helpful discussions and
comments, and to Thomas Hogan and Douglas Lloyd for research assistance.
Thanks also to the University of Michigan Law School, which provided generous
financial support for this project through the Cook Endowment.
1. 525 U.S. 266 (1999).
2. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 282 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926
(1995)).

3. Id. (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
4. Id. at 284. Lopez, in fact, references notjust section 5 but the Voting Rights
Act in its entirety. Id. (noting "[i]n short, [that] the Voting Rights Act, by its
nature, intrudes on state sovereignty").
5. Id. at 285.
6. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997); see alsoJohn
Matthew Guard, Comment, "Impotent Figureheads"?State Sovereignty, Federalism, and
the Constitutionalityof Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Lopez v. Monterey County
and City of Boerne v. Flores, 74 TUL. L. REV. 329, 357-58 (1999) (noting this tension); Charlotte Marx Harper, Note, Lopez v. Monterey County: A Remedy Gone
Too Far?, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 435, 452-54 (2000) (arguing that Lopez conflicts with
City of Boerne); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting
Rights and Remedies After Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 725, 726 (1998) (discussing
implications of City of Boerne for sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
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interpreting section 5, Reno v. Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish1),7 and Reno v.

Bossier Parish (Bossier Parish I).8 These decisions, handed down in 1997
and 2000 respectively, narrowly construe the VRA's preclearance provision
and invoke federalism concerns as justification. Bossier ParishI holds that
section 5 does not block implementation of voting changes that violate
section 2 of the VRA, 9 noting that the contrary construction would "increase further the serious federalism costs already implicated by § 5. " 10
Bossier ParishII reads section 5's purpose prong to proscribe retrogressive
intent only, and not an intent to dilute or an invidious intent more generally, and strangely cites Lopez as support for its claim that the broader reading would "exacerbate the 'substantial' federalism costs that the
preclearance procedure already exacts."' I
Left unexplained is why the Court understood the federalism costs
implicated in the Bossier Parishcases to be preclusively high, while it viewed
the costs at issue in Lopez to be the necessary andjustifiable result of implementing the VRA. As part of this Symposium on "The New Federalism,"
this Article will attempt an explanation. After providing a synopsis of the
decisions in Lopez and the Bossier Parishcases, it evaluates several rationales
for why the Court might have assessed the federalism costs so differently in
each decision. The implementation of congressional intent fails as an explanation given that Congress appears to have intended the broad construction of section 5 in all three cases. 1 2 Nor can the decisions be
reconciled based on the principle that enforcement of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments warrants intrusion into state sovereign processes.
Insofar as the Court read section 5 broadly in Lopez because it understood
the statute to be enforcing a constitutional right, it should have likewise
adopted broad readings in the BossierParishcases. So too, an understanding of the Constitution to mandate colorblindness lacks explanatory
power given that all three decisions promote racially-informed decisionmaking. Finally, the view that the majority-minority district gives rise to a
distinct, constitutionally-cognizable harm fails to explain the difference in
approach because this view should have led the Court to adopt narrow
13
constructions of section 5 in all three cases.
Instead, the Court's differing assessment of federalism costs in Lopez
and the BossierParishcases may best be seen to reflect the Court's concern
about institutional overreaching by the Department ofJustice (DOJ). The
7. 520 U.S. 471 (1997) [hereinafter

Bossier Parish 1].

8. 528 U.S. 320 (2000) [hereinafter Bossier Parish II].
9. Section 2 of the VRA, as amended in 1982, prohibits any voting "standard,
practice, or procedure" that "results in a denial or abridgement of the right.., to
vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994); see also infra note 58.
10. Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 480.
11. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 336 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County,
525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
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Rehnquist Court has long been convinced that DOJ has systematically
abused its authority in the preclearance process and thereby exacerbated
the federalism costs that inhere in the VRA. 14 The Bossier Parish cases involved DOJ's refusal to preclear a districting plan that the agency deemed
to contain an insufficient number of majority-minority districts. 15 Thus,
these cases presented the Court with the type of DOJ conduct that the
justices have repeatedly found most objectionable. The Bossier Parishdecisions rejected DOJ's position on preclearance and construed section 5
narrowly to curb opportunities for institutional overreaching by DOJ. Lopez, by contrast, did not directly implicate conduct by DOJ, and instead
addressed a question over which the Department has no authority, namely
whether the disputed changes were subject to preclearance at all. While
the decision renders more conduct subject to preclearance and hence to
review by DOJ, 16 Lopez required the Court neither to review a specific decision made by DOJ nor to confront the prospect that DOJ would implement the construction of the statute adopted. The Court, consequently,
was able to construe section 5 broadly without directly facing concerns
about DOJ overreaching, and thereby to embrace the resulting federalism
costs as a justified consequence of implementing congressional intent in
the VRA.
I.

THE DECISIONS

Perhaps more so than any other federal law to be upheld by the
United States Supreme Court, section 5 of the VRA, as enacted in 1965
and extended since, 1 7 dramatically shifts the balance of power between
the federal government and the States and state subdivisions where it ap-

14. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
16. Claims that an electoral change is subject to preclearance may be brought
before a state court or federal three-judge court within the jurisdiction, while the
Attorney General or the federal district court in the District of Columbia evaluate
preclearance submissions on their merits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see also
Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 23-24 (1996) (noting that three-judge district court "may determine only whether § 5 covers a contested change, whether
§ 5's approval requirements were satisfied, and if the requirements were not satis-

fied, what temporary remedy, if any, is appropriate");

SAMUEL

ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,

DEMocRAcy 579-80 (2d ed., 2001) (describing division of authority
regarding coverage questions and merits of preclearance submissions).
17. SeeVoting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 2, 5, 84
Stat. 314, 314-15 (1970); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 9473, §§ 204, 206, 405, 89 Stat. 402, 402-04 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 132-33 (1982).
THE

LAw

OF
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plies. 18 Applicable only in "covered" jurisdictions,' section 5 eliminates
the presumption of validity that typically attaches to governmental decisionmaking by blocking such jurisdictions from "enact[ing] or seek[ing]
to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting," unless the jurisdiction
receives federal judicial or administrative preclearance. 2 0 Covered jurisdictions must demonstrate, either to the Attorney General or to the federal district court in D.C., that a proposed change "does not have the
purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race or color," or, after 1975, membership in a lan21
guage minority group.
A.

Lopez v. Monterey County

Between 1972 and 1983, Monterey County, a jurisdiction covered
under section 5,22 adopted and implemented a series of ordinances that
consolidated the County's various judicial courts and established a single
23
countywide municipal court served by ten judges elected at-large.
Through various legislative acts, California, which is not covered under
24
section 5, facilitated this consolidation process.
18. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282-85 (1999) (upholding
constitutionality of 1982 extension of section 5 as applied in case); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980) (upholding 1975 extension of section
5); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (stating that Act permissibly requires federal scrutiny of new voting regulations); see also I LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW, 932 (3d ed., 2000) (describing VRA of 1965

as "probably the most radical piece of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction"); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don't Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 790 (1998) (describing preclearance process
as "an unprecedented federal intrusion into the governing processes of the
states").
19. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 437, 43839 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(B), (C), 1973c (1994)). Ajurisdiction was "covered" if, on the date the VRA became effective, it employed as a prerequisite to voting devices such as a literacy, understanding, subject matter or
moral character test, and less than fifty percent of the voting age population was
registered or actually voted in the presidential election of 1964. See id. (defining
what jurisdictions were covered). As Congress extended section 5 in 1970, 1975
and 1982, dates subsequent to 1964 were selected for comparative measurements.
See supra note 17.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c, 1973b(f) (2) (1994); Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-73, § 206, 89 Stat. 400, 401 (1975). Covered jurisdictions may seek preclearance
either from the Attorney General or from the district court in D.C. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c.
22. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 271.
23. See id. at 271-74; Lopez v. Monterey County, 871 F. Supp. 1254, 1256
(N.D. Cal. 1995).
24. See 1983 Cal. Stat. 1249, §§ 3, 16 (increasing number ofjudges in County's
municipal court district); 1979 Cal. Stat. 694 (requiring merger, already effected
by county ordinance, of municipal court districts in Monterey County); 1977 Cal.
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In 1991, a group of Latino voters residing in the County filed suit,
claiming that section 5 required that the County obtain preclearance
before implementing the ordinances. Complex proceedings followed. A
three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern Dis25
and the
trict of California agreed that preclearance was required,
County initiated an action in the federal district court in D.C. to obtain
it. 26 The County, however, subsequently agreed to dismiss its suit, stipulating that the ordinances had a retrogressive effect on Latino voting
strength and accordingly that it could not establish that they complied
with section 5.27 Thereafter, the parties returned to the federal threejudge panel in northern California with a new plan that retained a countywide municipal court, but created districts from which judges would be
elected .28

California intervened in the proceedings and argued that the plan
conflicted with the California Constitution, which requires correspon29
dence between ajudge's electoral base and his or her jurisdictional base.
The three-judge panel agreed and refused to approve the plan. When the
parties could not agree on a new plan that complied with both state and
federal law, the district court imposed a temporary plan under which
judges would be elected from districts, but serve countywide. The court
recognized that the plan conflicted with state law, but deemed the intrusubmitted this
sion on state interests to be relatively minor. 30 The County
31
it.
obtained
readily
and
preclearance
for
plan
interim
Elections proceeded under that plan in June 1995, but the Supreme
Court's decision shortly thereafter in Miller v.Johnson32 led the three-judge
panel to conclude that the interim plan was constitutionally suspect. The
court rescinded the plan and ordered the County to hold the March 1996
Stat. 995 (transforming justice court in Monterey County into municipal court); see
also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 5(b) (eliminating justice courts).
25. See Lopez, 871 F. Supp. at 1256.
26. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 274; see also supra note 16.
27. See Lopez, 871 F. Supp. at 1256 (quoting stipulation that "the Board of
Supervisors is unable to establish that the Municipal Court Judicial Court Consolidation Ordinances adopted by the County . . .did not have the effect of denying
the right to vote to Latinos in Monterey County due to the retrogressive effect
several of these ordinances had on Latino voting strength in Monterey County").
28. See id.
29. See id.; see also CAL. CONsT. art. VI, § 16(b) (requiring linkage between
judge's electoral and jurisdictional base).
30. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 275.

31. The County sought preclearance of the court-ordered plan because that
plan was based substantially on a proposal it submitted. See Lopez, 871 F. Supp. at
1261; see also McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 153 (1981) (stating that
preclearance is required "whenever a covered jurisdiction submits a proposal reflecting the policy choices of the elected representatives of the people-no matter
what constraints have limited the choices available to them").
32. 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that districting plan in which race predominates over traditional districting principles violates Constitution unless plan satisfies strict scrutiny).
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judicial elections under the original, unprecleared countywide regime.
The panel decreed that this plan was to govern the 1996 election only and
enjoined future elections pending preclearance of a permanent plan. 3 3
The Supreme Court responded with an emergency stay of the district
court's order and a subsequent decision enjoining the County from using
the unprecleared plan. 3 4 The Court acknowledged "the predicament"
faced by the three-judge panel given the County's longstanding failure to
obtain preclearance of a usable districting plan, the difficulty in constructing a plan that complied with both state and federal law, and the fact that
simply enjoining elections "would leave the County without ajudicial electoral system."3 5 In the Court's view, however, these factors did not alter
the fact that the County "has not discharged its obligation to submit its
voting changes" for preclearance. "The requirement of federal scrutiny
6
3
must be satisfied without delay."1

On remand, the district court, perhaps seeking a way out of the morass, reversed its original holding that section 5 applied to the County's
ordinances. Finding persuasive California's argument that state, not
county, law mandated the judicial structure the County had implemented, 3 7 the court held that a jurisdiction is subject to the preclearance
requirement only when it exercises some element of discretion over the
implemented electoral change. The County, the court found, had no
choice but to implement the countywide system and hence no duty to ob38
tain preclearance.
33. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1996).
34. See id. at 19.
35. See id. at 22.
36. Id. at 25.
37. California had raised this argument in the district court and before the
Supreme Court. The district court had deemed it unpersuasive, but offered the

State the opportunity to develop it in subsequent proceedings. The Supreme

Court refused to address this argument and instructed the district court to consider it on remand. See id. at 19-20.
38. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 276 (1999). More specifically, the court deemed relevant two laws consolidating the county courts. The
first was a 1979 state statute that consolidated the County's three existing municipal courts and mandated a single municipal court district in the County. As an
uncovered jurisdiction, California, the court noted, was not required to obtain
preclearance of this statute. See id. at 276-77. The court identified the only other
relevant change to the county's judicial electoral structure to be a 1983 county
ordinance merging the County's remaining justice court districts into the municipal court district. California had sought and obtained the Attorney General's approval for a 1983 state law recognizing the county's 1983 court merger and
authorizing new judgeships for it. The Attorney General did not oppose the submission, which included a copy of a 1983 county ordinance merging the courts,
and accordingly the submission "may well have served to preclear the 1983 county
ordinance." See Lopez, 519 U.S. at 15. Even if, however, the state law had not been
precleared, the court held that a 1995 amendment to the California Constitution
eliminating the justice courts would have resulted in the same merger effected by
the 1983 cotnty ordinance, and thus preclearance of those ordinances was not
required. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 276-77; CAL. CONsr. art. VI, § 5(b).
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The Supreme Court again reversed. Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Lopez holds that a covered jurisdiction "seek[s] to administer" a voting
change within the meaning of section 5 "when, without exercising any independent discretion ....

[it] implements a change required by the supe-

rior law of a noncovered State." 39 Justice O'Connor writes that neither
the word "seek" nor the word "administer" lends itself to a definition precluding nondiscretionary acts, and that other decisions by the Court and
lower federal courts assumed that voting changes enacted by partially covered States and affecting covered localities must be precleared. She notes
further that the Attorney General construed section 5 to be applicable in
received preclearance submisthese circumstances and that DOJ routinely
40
sions from States in these circumstances.
Justice Thomas' sole dissent charged that requiring preclearance of a
covered jurisdiction's implementation of a mandatory state law would
41
thwart the State's implementation of a uniform statewide voting policy.
Section 5, he writes, "is a unique requirement that exacts significant federalism costs" and that "[t]he Section's interference with state sovereignty is
quite drastic." 42 Application of section 5 must hinge on the jurisdiction's
history of wrongdoing, he argues, and this requirement is ignored by a
rule that requires preclearance of a covered jurisdiction's nondiscretionary implementation of an uncovered jurisdiction's mandates. The majority's construction thus "raise to new levels the federalism costs that the
43
statute imposes."
Justice O'Connor readily dismisses this concern. The VRA, she writes,
"authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local policymaking, [and thus] imposes substantial 'federalism costs.'

44

The Re-

construction Amendments, under which Congress enacted the VRA, "by
their nature contemplate some intrusion into areas traditionally reserved
to the States."45 The uniform implementation of state law may well be
hindered by the application of the preclearance requirement to ordinances such as those enacted by the County, but "only to the extent that
46
that law affects voting in jurisdictions properly designated for coverage."
Justice O'Connor concludes: "[Tihe Voting Rights Act, by its nature, intrudes on state sovereignty. The Fifteenth Amendment permits this intru39. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 278.
40. See id. at 279-81.
41. Joined by the ChiefJustice,Justice Kennedy concurred, arguing that some
element of discretion was required to trigger the preclearance requirement, but
deeming the County to have exercised such discretion in implementing the
changes. See id. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 293 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 296 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 282 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)).

45. Id. (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980)).
46. Id. at 284.
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sion... and our holding today adds nothing of constitutional moment to
47
the burdens that the Act imposes."
B.

Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board I & II

The Court understood the burdens imposed by section 5 quite differently when it assessed whether a districting plan adopted by the Bossier
Parish School Board (the Board) deserved preclearance. Citing federalism concerns, Bossier Parish I and Bossier Parish II adopt narrow constructions of section 5 and thereby enable covered jurisdictions to obtain
preclearance more easily.
The dispute in the Bossier Parish cases concerned the redistricting
plan adopted by the Board following the 1990 Census. The Board, a covered jurisdiction under the VRA, consists of twelve members elected from
single-member districts to serve four-year terms. At the time the Board set
out to redraw its districts, 48 the Bossier Parish Police Jury, the principal
governing body of the Parish, had already adopted and obtained
preclearance of a twelve-district redistricting plan for its elections. The
Board, however, initially declined to adopt the police jury plan, most likely
because it transgressed some of the Board's traditional districting
49
principles.
As the Board embarked on devising its own plan, the local NAACP
chapter sought inclusion in the districting process and submitted a redistricting proposal that included two majority-black districts.5 0 The population of the Parish at the time was approximately twenty percent AfricanAmerican. 5' The record indicates that at least some members of the
Board were opposed to creating any majority-black districts52 and that the
Board generally was not receptive to the NAACP's proposal. 5 3 As contro47. Id.

48. The Board initially had sought to develop ajoint districting plan with the
police jury, but the Jury was not interested in a cooperative effort. See BossierParish
II, 528 U.S. 320, 344 (2000) (discussing stipulations).
49. See id. at 346-47 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that plan disregarded school attendance zones, included two districts without schools, pitted two pairs of Board incumbents against each other and created
two districts in which no incumbent resided; that four districts failed Board cartographer's standard for compactness, and one contained noncontiguous elements;
and that plan also exceeded total population variance typically used to satisfy one
person, one vote requirement).
50. See id. at 323.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 348 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that Board member Henry Bums told one black leader that he personally favored black representation on Board, but that number of other Board members
opposed idea, and that, according to NAACP representative George Price, Board
member Barry Musgrove indicated that Board was hostile to creation of majorityblack district).
53. See id.
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versy in the Parish mounted, the Board adopted the police jury plan,
54
which, like its predecessor, included no districts with a black majority.

Insofar as the Board expected that the police jury plan would be easily
precleared, it was mistaken. While the Attorney General had once
precleared that plan, she now objected to the Board's adoption of it. Invoking the language used by the Court in Thornburgv. Gingles,55 she stated
that new information-namely the NAACP's proposal-demonstrated
that "black residents are sufficiently numerous and geographically compact so as to constitute a majority in two single-member districts." 56 Disavowing any attempt to compel the Board to adopt a particular plan, the
Attorney General blocked preclearance on the ground that the Board was
"not free to adopt a plan that unnecessarily limits the opportunity for
minority voters to elect their candidates of choice."5 7 In other words, the
Attorney General concluded that the failure of the police jury plan to create two majority-black districts violated section 2 of the VRA 58 and that this
59
violation was grounds to deny preclearance.
The Supreme Court disagreed. 60 BossierParishI holds that a violation
of section 2 of the VRA is not alone grounds to deny preclearance because
54. See id. at 323-24.
55. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
56. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 324.
57. Id.; see also Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 475-76 (1997).
58. Section 2 prohibits any voting "standard, practice, or procedure" that "resuits in a denial or abridgement of the right ... to vote on account of race or
color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994). A voting practice is dilutive and violates section 2:
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to the nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to [members of the protected class] in
that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of
their choice.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994).
Proof of vote dilution under section 2 requires establishment of the so-called
Gingles preconditions. SeeThornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (setting
forth preconditions that racial group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district;" that the group is "politically cohesive," and that the majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it...
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate"). Section 2 also requires evidence that the totality of circumstances supports the dilutive quality of the practice. SeeJohnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011 (1994).
59. See also 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2) (1996) (authorizing denial of
preclearance to prevent "clear violation" of section 2).
60. The Board responded to the Attorney General's ruling by seeking and
obtaining preclearance in federal district court. There, the three-judge panel,
over a dissent, rejected the Attorney General's construction of section 5, holding
that a section 2 violation is not grounds to deny preclearance. See Bossier Parish v.
Reno, 907 F. Supp. 434, 440-41 (D.D.C. 1995). The court further held that evidence of a section 2 violation does not inform the inquiry into discriminatory purpose under section 5. See id. at 445. Finally, the court held that the Board had
acted with legitimate, nondiscriminatory purposes in adopting the police jury plan,
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retrogression provides the sole measure of a section 5 discriminatory "effect." 631 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court states that the contrary
holding would not only contravene precedent,6 2 but also would violate
established norms of federalism. A finding of retrogression, that is, that a
proposed change worsens the condition of a minority group, requires a
comparison of a proposed change against the benchmark of an existing
rule. Section 2's proscription against vote dilution, by contrast, requires a
comparison with the benchmark riot of an existing practice, but of an
imagined, undiluted practice. Justice O'Connor explains that to construe
section 5 to bar preclearance of changes that violate section 2 would require covered jurisdictions to litigate whether a proposed change has a
dilutive result under such a hypothetical standard. Section 5, however,
"already imposes upon a covered jurisdiction the difficult burden of proving the absence of discriminatory purpose and effect."6 3 To add defending
against claims of vote dilution "isto increase further the serious federalism
costs already implicated by § 5."64 Two years later, Justice O'Connor
would embrace these costs in Lopez, but in Bossier Parish I, she narrowly
construes section 5 because of the "difficult burden" section 5 imposes
and the "serious federalism costs" it generates.
Bossier ParishII similarly invokes federalism costs as justification for a
narrow construction of section 5. Bossier Parish I holds that evidence of a
section 2 violation, while alone not grounds to deny preclearance, informs
the inquiry into impermissible purpose under section 5. The district court
had not evaluated the section 2 claim in this regard and thus the Court
remanded the case for such consideration. 65 Bossier Parish I, however,
reserves the question "whether the § 5 purpose inquiry ever extends beyond the search for retrogressive intent."66 Bossier Parish II answers that
question with a resounding no.
namely, the anticipation that preclearance would be readily granted, and the concern about implementation problems that inhered in the NAACP plan. See id. at
447. The Attorney General appealed and the Supreme Court responded with its
decision in Bossier Parish I.
61. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 485. The Attorney General's denial of
preclearance rested on the conclusion that the Board's plan constituted a "clear
violation" of section 2, see 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (2) (1996), and not on the finding
that the plan was retrogressive. See 520 U.S. at 475 (noting parties' stipulation that
plan was not retrogressive); id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that "[n]one of the 12 districts had ever had a black majority
and a black person had never been elected to the Board"). Following BossierParish
I, the Board acknowledged that its adopted plan diluted the minority vote in violation of section 2. See BossierParish I, 528 U.S. at 343-44, 349 (Souter,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
62. This precedent was less definitive than Justice O'Connor suggested. See
infra note 97 and accompanying text.
63. Bossier Parish ,520 U.S. at 480.
64. Id. That jurisdictions would not bear the burden of proof in such litigation was of no consequence. See id.
65. See id. at 486-87.
66. See id. at 486.
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Justice Scalia's opinion for a divided Court holds that section 5's purpose prong proscribes only a retrogressive purpose, and not a discriminatory purpose more broadly understood. 6 7 He explains that the Court had
already concluded that section 5's use of the phrase "abridging the right
to vote on account of race or color" limited the term "effect" to retrogressive effect.6 8 Established canons of statutory interpretation, Justice Scalia
writes, require that retrogression also provide the measure of a section 5
purpose, otherwise, the Court "would attribute different meanings to the
same phrase in the same sentence. ' 69 Precedent suggested the Court had
previously recognized such a divergence, but Bossier ParishII deems it distinguishable. 7°1 Nor does limiting section 5's purpose prong to retrogressive purpose render it meaningless: while the natural linguistic
consequence of the parallel construction meant that only the incompetent
71
retrogresser would violate it and not also run afoul of its effects prong,
the term retains "value and effect," Bossier Parish II asserts, given that the
government may more easily refute ajurisdiction's claim of nonretrogres72
sive purpose than its assertion of nonretrogressive effect.

Bossier Parish II recognizes that section 5 contains language "virtually
identical" to language in section 2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment and that the Court had read the latter provisions to extend beyond
retrogression. Bossier Parish II, however, insists that the "context" of the
preclearance process, with its goal of preventing "backsliding," explains
the difference in approach. 73" A broader construction of section 5, Justice
Scalia explains, would conflate section 2 with section 5, something "we
declined to do in Bossier Parish L-74 Concerns for federalism, the Court
insists, also counsel against this approach, particularly given the "ex67. Considerable evidence suggested that the Board acted with invidious, but
not retrogressive, intent when it adopted the challenged districting plan. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 343-355 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (detailing Board's repeated efforts to block desegregation and
other actions evincing discriminatory intent).
68. Id. at 329.
69. Id. (citing Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 129 (1983)).
70. Bossier Parish II "acknowledge [s] that Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358 (1975), created a discontinuity between the effect and purpose prongs of§ 5,"
given that the decision both approved a voting change despite its seeming retrogressive effect and asserted that a retrogressive purpose warranted a denial of
preclearance. Bossier ParishH dismisses this disjunction as "nothing more than an
ex necessitate limitation upon the effect prong in the particular context of annexation." See id. at 330; cf id. at 369-71 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part) (reading Richmond to extend beyond annexation context and to hold that
discriminatory, albeit nonretrogressive intent, suffices to block preclearance).
71. See id. at 332 (noting that "[w]henever Congress enacts a statute that bars
conduct having 'the purpose or effect of x,' the purpose prong has application
entirely separate from that of the effect prong only with regard to unlikely conduct
that has 'the purpose of x' but fails to have 'the effect of x"').
72. See id.
73. See id. at 334-35; see also infra note 130 and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 336.
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traordinary burden-shifting procedures of § 5.''75 While Justice Souter's
dissent charges that the broad construction of section 5 "would not raise
76
the cost of federalism one penny above what Congress meant it to be,"
the majority responds by invoking Lopez and stating that to construe the
preclearance provision to transcend retrogression would "exacerbate the
'substantial' federalism costs that the preclearance procedure already exacts." 77 Doing so might even "rais[e] concerns about § 5's constitutionality," 78 and thus the Court adopts the narrow construction.
II.

THE CASES COMPARED

Lopez and the BossierParish cases approach section 5 very differently.
Lopez readily interprets the preclearance provision broadly, easily accepting the "intrusion" into "sensitive areas of state and local policymaking" effected by the statute and its consequent "substantial 'federalism
costs.'" ' 79 The Court in the Bossier Parish cases appears far more wary of
the statute's intrusiveness and more inclined to limit its scope to minimize
the resulting "federalism costs." Relying on conclusory statements about
federal power, these decisions fail to explain the distinct value each attaches to the federalism costs at issue. This Part assesses several factors
that might explain the difference in approach.
A.

CongressionalIntent

Congressional intent fails to explain the Court's divergent assessment
of federalism costs in these cases. To be sure, insofar as Congress intended the application of section 5 adopted in Lopez, the resulting federalism costs are warranted, or at least the Court could so conclude, assuming,
of course, that Congress had constitutional power to enact such a provision.3 ° Likewise, if the broader construction of section 5 rejected in the
Bossier Parish cases contravened congressional intent, the Court rightly refused to countenance the federalism costs that would have resulted. But
while Congress may have intended the construction of section 5 adopted
in Lopez, it appears not to have intended the construction of section 5
approved in the Bossier Parish cases and, indeed, likely intended the re81
jected readings.
75. Id. at 335.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 372 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 336 (citing Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
Id.
See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999).

80. See supra note 6 and infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
81. See also The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV.
379, 380 (2000) (arguing that Bossier Parish ll"imposed its own restrictive view of
the statute over a constitutionally permissible interpretation that both Congress

and the Justice Department had found to be politically accountable and just"). But
see The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Leading Cases, 111 HARv. L. REV. 421, 426 (1997)
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Lopez locates congressional support for its construction of section 5
primarily in the statute's language. "The face of the Act itself," Justice
O'Connor writes, "provides the most compelling support" for this construction. 82 She explains that in common parlance, "seek to administer"
encompasses nondiscretionary acts, and provides "no indication" Congress
intended to limit preclearance to the discretionary acts of a covered jurisdiction.83 This understanding of congressional intent, O'Connor continues, is strengthened by precedent, which has assumed section 5's
application when a noncovered State effects voting changes in covered
counties; 84 by the practice of DOJ, which routinely reviews preclearance
applications from uncovered jurisdictions;8 5 and by the Attorney Gen86
eral's understanding of congressional intent, which parallels the Court's.
The central purpose of the preclearance process, however, arguably
suggests a contrary reading. Congress enacted section 5 "to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim." 87 Under section 5, electoral changes implemented by jurisdictions

covered because of their history of wrongdoing are presumed to be invalid, and the jurisdictions themselves face the burden of proving otherwise.
This regime suggests Congress anticipated that preclearance would be applicable only to the decisions of covered jurisdictions themselves, that is, to
the choices made by covered entities as opposed to their nondiscretionary
implementation of mandates issued by others.88 Both the concurrence
and dissent raise this point, but their opposition to the majority's understanding of congressional intent is noticeably tepid. Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion notes that it is "quite possible" that the statute requires a discretionary element and states that this reading "draws some
support" from precedent. 89 Similarly measured, Justice Thomas' dissent
acknowledges that "the majority's construction of the phrase [seek to administer] is not plainly erroneous." 9°' He offers an alternative reading of
the phrase to preclude nondiscretionary acts, 9' but does so, as does Justice
Kennedy, not so much because he deems Congress to have dictated this
(arguing that Bossier Parish I "reached the result most consistent with legislative
intent and precedent").
82. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 278.
83. See id.

84. See id. at 279-80.
85. See id. at 280.
86. See id. at 281 (noting that "we find it especially relevant that the Attorney
General also reads § 5 as we do" and that "we traditionally afford substantial deference" to Attorney General's interpretation) (citations omitted). This deference is
markedly absent in both BossierParishcases. See infra notes 94, 118 and accompanying text.
87. H.R. REP. No. 94-196, at 57-58 (1970).
88. See Harper, supra note 6, at 454-55 (arguing that precedent supports this
reading).
89. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 288 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
90. Id. at 290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at 290-92 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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result, but because of his concern that the majority's construction is "constitutionally doubtful." 9 2 Indeed, it is this constitutional doubt, and not
the clarity of congressional intent, that leads both justices to ignore the
Attorney General's view of the matter.' 5 To the extent Congress did not
unambiguously mandate Lopez's rule, that view, which parallels the Court's
holding, represents a reasonable construction of the statute. Neither the
dissent nor the concurrence suggests otherwise.
By contrast, the Bossier Parish decisions sustain narrow and strained
readings of section 5 that are difficult to square with Congress' likely intent. Bossier ParishI holds that Congress never intended that a prohibited
section 5 effect encompass a violation of section 2, and finds this intent to
be "sufficiently clear" to warrant invalidation of the Attorney General's
contrary regulation. 94 Justice O'Connor's opinion locates this intent not
in the language of the statute,9'5 but in precedent and the congressional
92. Id. at 293 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that "'[w]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional
questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to
adopt the latter"') (quoting United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)). A corollary to the principle of avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions is that Congress intended the interpretation that in fact avoids them. See
generally DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (noting that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress"). Neither Justices Thomas nor Kennedy phrases his objection
in these terms, however, and sustaining such a claim would have been difficult.
Congress last addressed section 5 on its merits in 1982, see Act of June 29, 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, fifteen years before the Court handed down City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), based on which Justice Thomas raised the
constitutional objection. See generally Akhil R. Amar, Foreward: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 118 (2000) (arguing that Boerne doctrine represents "new rule of doctrine ... [that] contrasts sharply with the text, history, and
overall architecture of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1158-65
(2001) (arguing that "congruence and proportionality standard" articulated in City

of Boerne cases departs from original intent and understanding); see also infra notes
151-56 and accompanying text.
93. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engr's, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001) (noting that "[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect clear
indication that Congress intended that result"); DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575; cf.
Patricia M. Wald, JudicialReview in Midpassage: The Uneasy PartnershipBetween Courts
and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 245-46 (1996) (urging judicial restraint
against curbing agency discretion based on "mere fact that an agency is acting in
an area with constitutional implications," and arguing that "the agency's interpretation must raise a concrete and avoidable constitutional question, in order to
trump Chevron deference").
94. See BossierParish 1, 520 U.S. 471, 483 (1997) (refusing to defer to Attorney
General's regulation that preclearance be withheld "to prevent a clear violation of
amended Section 2") (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (2) (1996)).
95. See id. at 497, 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(noting that majority does not hold Attorney General's regulation to conflict with
statutory text).
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failure to alter that precedent by amending the language of section 5.96
That precedent, however, is hardly unequivocal and indeed, like the legislative history to the VRA's 1982 amendments, supports the interpretation
adopted by the Attorney General's regulation, namely that changes violat97
ing section 2 should not be precleared.
The longstanding precedent to which Justice O'Connor referred was
the Court's 1976 decision, Beer v. United States,98 in which the Court, for
the first time, 99 stated that section 5 was meant to block voting changes
that "would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities."10 0
Beer added, however, that "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment
cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on
the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution."Il" Thus, Beeritself
indicated that the Court did not understand retrogression to be the sole
measure of section 5.102 The question is how far beyond retrogression the
Court understood section 5 to extend. Beer referenced White v. Regester'0 3
for its assertion that unconstitutional voting practices should not be
precleared. White held unconstitutional an apportionment plan under
which, based on the totality of circumstances, members of a racial minority
"had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate
96. See id. at 483 (noting that "[g]iven our longstanding interpretation of § 5,
which Congress has declined to alter by amending the language of § 5, we believe
Congress has made it sufficiently clear that a violation of § 2 is not grounds in and
of itself for denying preclearance under § 5") (citations omitted).
97. But cf The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, supra note 81, at 422 (arguing that
Bossier Parish I "reached the result truest to congressional intent and judicial
precedent").
98. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). BossierParish I also relies on City of Lockhart v. United
States, which holds that preclearance is warranted where proposed changes "may
have the effect of discriminating against minorities" in some circumstances, because the changes did "not increase the degree of discrimination" against a minority population. See Lockhart, 460 U.S. 125, 134, 135 (1983). Lockhart, however,
relied exclusively on Beerfor its conclusion that the absence of retrogression means
preclearance is warranted and, like Beer itself, did not involve the allegation that a
nonretrogressive change "was so discriminatory that it clearly violated some other
federal law." See id. at 134-36; see also Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
99. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 364 n.13 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting that term retrogression "appears for the
first time in a federal case in Bee'); Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 134 (reading Beer as holding that preclearance should follow where "new plan does not increase the degree
of discrimination against blacks"); United Jewish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 159
(1977) (noting that Beer "established" that section 5 bars implementation of retrogressive plan); Heather K. Way, Note, A Shield or a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act and the Argument for the Incorporation of Section 2, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1439,

1445-46 (1996) (same).
100. Beer, 425 U.S. at 141.
101. Id.

102. See Bossier Parish 1,520 U.S. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (rejecting Court's "assumption that § 5 is concerned only with
retrogressive effects and purposes").
103. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice."10 4 At the
time, this standard was the constitutional standard for vote dilution, and
section 2 of the VRA was thought to add nothing to the constitutional
proscription. l 05 The Court in Beer, accordingly, had no reason to distinguish a constitutional violation from conduct transgressing the standard
set forth in White v. Regester from conduct violating section 2 of the VRA.
These violations were one and the same and all grounds for denying
preclearance.
Subsequent to Beer, however, the Court held that invidious intent is an
essential element of a Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violation,1' 6
and Congress responded by codifying the White v. Regester standard in the
1982 amendments to section 2 of the VRA.) ° 7 With the constitutional
standard now diverging from the statutory one, the question arises
whether changes that violate the latter are grounds to deny preclearance.
Beer itself does not answer that question as the Court there had no occasion to confront it and the decision is inherently ambiguous on this point.
The legislative history to the 1982 amendments to the VRA suggests,
however, that Congress meant for a violation of amended section 2 to be
grounds to deny preclearance. The Senate Report squarely states that "in
light of the amendment to section 2, it is intended that a section 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure so discriminates as to violate
section 2."108 Justice O'Connor's opinion in Bossier ParishI dismisses this
seemingly unambiguous statement because Congress did not amend the
language of section 5.1)9 Congress would not, she writes, "depart from the

settled interpretation of § 5 and impose a demonstrably greater burden . . . by dropping a footnote in a Senate Report instead of amending
the statute itself."' II' That interpretation of section 5, namely that retrogression defines the full scope of a section 5 effect, however, was hardly
settled, and the "demonstrably greater burden" was that imposed by governing law before the Court's 1980 decision in Mobile v. Bolden''I and ar104. White, 412 U.S. at 766.
105. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 392 (1991) (noting that section 2 as
originally enacted "was unquestionably coextensive with the coverage provided by
the Fifteenth Amendment"); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (stating
that "it is apparent that the language of § 2 no more than elaborates upon that of
the Fifteenth Amendment, and.., that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment itself."); see also ISSACHAROFF ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 739.
106. See generally Mobile, 446 U.S. 55; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (1994); S. REP. No. 97-417, at 15-16 (1982).
108. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 12 n.31.
109. See BossierParish1, 520 U.S. 471, 483-84 (1997) (noting "[t]hat there may
be some suggestion" in the Senate Report that Congress intended violation of section 2 to be grounds for denying preclearance under section 5).
110. Id. at 484.
111. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
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guably thereafter as well.' 12 Congress, accordingly, may have deemed an
3
amendment to the language of section 5 unnecessary. 1
To be sure, there is room for debate about congressional intent on
this point.' 14 Beer itself is typically remembered as establishing the nonretrogression rule,"15 and it specifically referenced constitutional and not
statutory violations as additional grounds for denying preclearance. 1 6 In
1982, Congress may have read Beer in this narrow sense, and, the Senate
Report's language notwithstanding, retained the language in section 5 to
preserve this understanding. But while the argument that Congress may
have intended to exclude a section 2 violation from a section 5 effect may
not be wholly implausible, 1 7 congressional intent on this point is hardly
unambiguous. Bossier Parish I suggests, however, that it is. The Court's
rejection of the Attorney General's regulation necessarily implies that
Congress spoke with sufficient clarity to override the agency's view, a view
that was embodied in a formal regulation and to which deference is typically accorded.' 18

112. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
113. See H.R. REP. No. 97-227, at 28 (1981) ("Under the Voting Rights Act,
whether a discriminatory practice or procedure is of recent origin affects only the
mechanism that triggers relief, i.e., litigation [under § 2] or preclearance [under
§ 5]."); Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 506 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (arguing that House Report "conveys the same message" as the Senate Report on this point); cf. Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Voting Rights Act: Proposed Section 5 Regulations, 99th Cong. 5
(1986) (finding, after oversight hearing on proposed regulation, "that it is a
proper interpretation of the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to use Section 2 standards in the course of making Section 5 determinations").
114. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, supra note 81, at 386 (noting that
"[a] revision of Beers calibration of effect would require a stronger statement of
intent than exists in the record").
115. See, e.g., Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come,
26 RUTGERS L.J. 723, 750 (1995) (citing Beer for proposition that before 1982 VRA
amendments, "a jurisdiction subject to the preclearance provisions of Section 5
needed to show only that a proposed voting change, btherwise free of discriminatory intent, did not have a retrogressive effect on a covered minority population");
see also supra note 99.
116. SeeBeerv. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (stating that "an ameliorative new legislative apportionment cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the
Constitution").
117. Cf Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (stating that Congress never intended what majority's construction required, namely that "the Attorney General of the United States ...
place her stamp of approval on a state action that is in clear violation of federal
law").
118. See United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2172-73 (2001) (noting
that deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), is accorded to agency interpretations found in formal agency regulations or produced
by other procedures assuring "fairness and deliberation"); see also id. at 2184
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing Chevron deference applies so long as agency position is evident "in a course of unstructured administrative actions" and reflects
"the official position of the agency"). The Court, moreover, in Lopez and other
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The Attorney General's construction of section 5 and the longstanding practice of DOJ implementing it proved no more persuasive to the
Court in BossierParish II. In this case, the Court again adopts a construction of the statute that seems contrary to congressional intent, holding
that section 5's purpose prong reaches retrogressive intent only and not
discriminatory intent more broadly. Bossier ParishII states that established
principles of statutory construction and the particular "context" of
preclearance demonstrate that Congress intended this result. Neither factor, however, unequivocally establishes congressional intent on this point.
First, Justice Scalia states that section 5's purpose prong must be limited to retrogressive purpose because Beer held retrogression to define the
full scope of a section 5 effect. This reading of Beer 19 supports the
Court's construction, but does not mandate it;1 21 that is, even if Congress
meant to limit section 5's prohibition on discriminatory effects to retrogressive effects,1 2 1 it need not have intended to restrict similarly the statute's prohibition on discriminatory purpose. A discriminatory purpose
such as an intent to dilute is always invidious, while a policy yielding a
dilutive or otherwise discriminatory effect may or may not reflect ill-will on
the part of the policymaker. 122 Limiting section 5's effect prong to retrogressive effect arguably restricts its reach to conduct for which invidious
decisions, has accorded deference to the Attorney General's construction of section 5. See, e.g., NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 17879 (1985) ("Any doubt that these changes are covered by § 5 is resolved by the
construction placed upon the Act by the Attorney General, which is entitled to
considerable deference"); Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 429 U.S. 32, 39
(1978) (noting that deference to Attorney General stems from his "central role...
in formulating and implementing" section 5); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379,
390-91 (1971) (holding that regarding coverage of section 5 "draws further support from the interpretation followed by the Attorney General in his administration of the statute"). Cf supra note 86 and accompanying text.
119. Beer was more ambiguous on this point than Justice Scalia suggests. See
supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
120. See also The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, supra note 81, at 385-86 (arguing
that congressional intent on this point was ambiguous and that Court should have
deferred to DOJ's view rejecting parallel construction).
121. For a discussion as to why Congress likely did not so intend, see supra
notes 108-13 and infra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
122. See generally Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268, 270 (1977) (rejecting argument that racially disparate impact, standing alone,
implies discriminatory purpose); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
(stating that Court has never "embraced the proposition that a law or other official
act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact"); Robert G.
Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 1023-34 (discussing Court's
standards for determining whether disparate impact is result of invalid discrimination); Cf PeterJ. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A ComprehensiveApproach
to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 134 (2000) (arguing
that "the dilutive effect of any districting plan does reflect 'discriminatory intent'
on the part of the voters").
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intent is the likely explanation. 123 Whether established by Beer or later by
Bossier Parish I, this rule may well be sensible in light of recent case law
circumscribing congressional authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 124 Congress, however, need not have similarly limited section 5's purpose prong given that it prohibits conduct proscribed
Beer
by the Constitution itself, namely intentional discrimination.
anachronistically suggested this result when it stated that preclearance
2 5
should be denied when a change violates the Constitution.
Indeed, the particular "context" of preclearance, cited in Bossier Parish
II in support of its holding, 126 suggests congressional intent for section 5
to transcend retrogression. EchoingJustice O'Connor's opinion in Bossier
Parish 1,127 Justice Scalia explains that because the preclearance process
"uniquely... and specifically" addresses only voting changes, it requires a
comparison of the change against the status quo, a comparison that the
concept of retrogression captures. 128 Under this view, section 5 does not
guard against vote dilution more generally, be it intentional or not, given
that dilution entails a comparison not with the status quo, but with the
hypothetical alternative of an undiluted vote.' 2 9 The different comparative focus, the Court maintains, justifies construing section 5 differently
from the Fifteenth Amendment and other provisions of the VRA which
contain "virtually identical language" to section 5, and have not been read
130
to be limited to retrogression.
123. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 857, 898 (1999) (arguing that Washington v. Davis' discriminatory intent rule "reflects practical concerns with the remedial consequences of
an effects test").
124. See supra note 6 and infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
125. See Beer v. United States, 415 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). Anachronistically
because the Court had not yet established intent to be a requisite element of a
constitutional violation, nor had it articulated the standard of congruence and
proportionality. See supra notes 92, 96. Language in Bossier Parish I supports this
reading of Beer. See Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 483 (noting that Beer cited White v.
Regester "not for itself, but because it embodied the current constitutionalstandard
for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . [and w]hen White ceased to
represent the current understanding of the Constitution, a violation of its standard . . . no longer constituted grounds for a denial of preclearance under Beer).
But Bossier Parish II rejects this reading. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 337-38
(2000) (stating that Beers statement that section 5 blocks changes that violate Constitution was referring neither to intentional discrimination, which had yet to become essential element of constitutional violation, nor to effects-based
discrimination, which would have negated retrogression standard, and instead was
to unconstitutional action that denies, as opposed to abridges, right to vote, and
thus does not encompass vote dilution, which falls under latter term).
126. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 334.
127. See BossierParish1, 520 U.S. at 478; see also supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
128. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 334.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 333. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (preclearance should be denied if
changes have purpose or effect of "denying or abridging the right to vote on ac-
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As Beer itself indicates, 13 1 however, section 5's focus on electoral
changes does not necessarily establish that Congress meant for retrogression to define the full extent of the statutory standard. Section 5 does not
mention retrogression at all, and the legislative history to the statute as
originally enacted and extended since suggests congressional intent not
simply to prevent covered jurisdictions from "undo[ing] or defeat[ing]
the rights recently won,"' 13 2 but to block the implementation of new practices that perpetuate existing discrimination.1 33 So understood, section 5
does not preserve the status quo, but actively promotes equal opportunity
in the political process. Indeed, Congress' decision to use the same language in section 5 as appears in the Fifteenth Amendment suggests its
intent for the statute to transcend retrogressive practices. Congressional
reliance on terminology that tracks the language of the constitutional provision it seeks to enforce is generally read to signal congressional intent
that the terms be given the same meaning. 13 4 The Fifteenth Amendment
has never been limited to retrogression and, the assertion in Bossier Parish
count of race or color"), with U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"), and 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1975) (providing that "[n]o voting [practice] shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color").
131. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
132. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
91-397, at 8 (1969)); see also Bossier ParishI, 528 U.S. at 363 (Souter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing Beers "imposition of a nontextual limitation ... [from] a single fragment of legislative history," and arguing that "the
legislative history is replete with references to the need to block changes in voting
practices that would perpetuate existing discrimination and stand in the way of
truly nondiscriminatory alternatives").
133. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (preclearance procedure "was designed
to insure that old devices for disenfranchisement would not simply be replaced by
new ones"); S. REP. No. 94-295, at 15-17 (1975) (noting importance of section 5 "as
a means of promoting and preserving minority political gains in covered jurisdictions"); H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 10 (1965) (noting that "even after apparent defeat[s] resisters seek new ways and means of discriminating . . . [and that]
[b]arring one contrivance too often has caused no change in result, only in methods."); S. REP. No. 89-162, pt. 3, at 12 (1965) (noting that after losing voting rights
cases, jurisdictions adopted new voting requirements "'as a means for continuing
the rejection of qualified Negro applicants' (quoting United States v. Parker, 236
F. Supp. 511, 517 (M.D. Ala. 1964))); see also Bossier ParishII, 528 U.S. at 366 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting, inter alia, that the "statute contains no reservation in favor of customary abridgment grown familiar after
years of relentless discrimination, and the preclearance requirement was not enacted to authorize covered jurisdictions to pour old poison into new bottles"); Beer,
425 U.S. at 152 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
134. See, e.g.,
Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 358 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing cases so holding). Congress enacted the VRA pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325-27 (1966); S.REP. No. 97-417,
at 40.
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II notwithstanding, 135 has been thought to proscribe racial vote dilution. 136 To be sure, the term "dilution" was not used before 1969, but the
practice predates the term,' 37 and even if it did not, the very purpose of
the preclearance process is to block "new ways and means of discriminating" implemented as old "contrivances" are struck down. 13 8 Each time
Congress extended section 5 to provide for additional years of coverage, it
noted its expectation that the preclearance standard would encompass racial vote dilution.

13 9

At bottom, Bossier Parish II espouses an implausible conclusion:
namely, even though Congress created the preclearance procedure because covered jurisdictions engaged repeatedly in acts of unconstitutional
discrimination, it did not intend to block implementation of voting
changes enacted with precisely this purpose.1 4 0 The Attorney General
had long adopted the contrary interpretation, denying preclearance to
changes DOJ determined had been enacted or implemented with a discriminatory purpose.141 Dispensing with the deference typically afforded
135. See BossierParishII, 528 U.S. at 334 n.3 (suggesting that vote dilution does
not violate Fifteenth Amendment).
136. See id. at 360 n.ll (Souter J., dissenting) (stating that Court has suggested Fifteenth Amendment applies to dilution claims); see also Ellen D. Katz, Race
and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. REV. 491, 524 n.161 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see also BossierParish
11, 528 U.S. at 364 & n.13 (Souter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);J.
MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 25-31 (1999); HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ,
RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890, 126, 269-73 (1978).

138. H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 10.
139. See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 6 (noting that following rise in registration
resulting from VRA of 1965, "a broad array of dilution schemes were employed to
cancel the impact of the new black vote"); S. REP. No. 94-295, at 16-17 (identifying
continuing need for preclearance procedure given adoption of dilutive measures
including switching to at-large elections, annexations of predominately white areas
or adoption of discriminatory redistricting plans); H.R. REP. No. 91-397, at 6-7
(noting continued need for preclearance requirement given that, as voter registration rose, various jurisdictions "have undertaken new, unlawful ways to diminish
the Negroes' franchise and to defeat Negro and Negro-supported candidates" including use of numerous dilutive techniques); see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 7 n.8
(noting that in both 1970 and 1975, Congress renewed section 5 "with ftll awareness of its interpretation by the courts to include dilution and other evasive mechanisms, as well as outright denials of the opportunity to register or vote" and that
"Congress has twice ratified this interpretation of the intended scope of Section

5").
140. See also Rubin, supra note 122, at 92 (describing Bossier Parish I's "remarkable holding that preclearance under the Voting Rights Act must be granted
to laws that are adopted with discriminatory intent, so long as the intent behind
them was to leave the members of the racial minority group against whom they are
aimed in no worse a position than they were under the previous law").
141. The applicable regulation stated that "the Attorney General will consider
whether the change is free of discriminatory purpose and retrogressive effect in
light of, and with particular attention being given to, the requirements of the 14th,
15th, and 24th amendments to the Constitution." See 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(a) (1994).
DOJ argued that it had consistently applied this regulation to block practices im-
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to DOJ given its role in administering section 5,142 the decision, as Justice
Souter's dissent notes, creates a regime under which "executive and judicial officers of the United States will be forced to preclear illegal and unconstitutional voting schemes patently intended to perpetuate
discrimination." 4 3 The majority's claim that Congress meant to limit section 5's purpose prong to retrogressive purpose alone is unpersuasive.
B.

Vindicating a Constitutional Right

The Rehnquist Court has intervened deeply in state electoral
processes when it has understood the Constitution to require it. 144 While
Bush v. Gore145 generated charges of hypocrisy, ' 4 6 this Court has long been

engaged in a dramatic restructuring of state governance even as it has elsewhere vigorously promoted state sovereignty at the expense of federal

plemented with a discriminatory, but nonretrogressive, purpose. See Brief for Federal Appellant at 32-33, Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320 (2000) (No. 98-405)
(discussing Department's position); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924
(1995) (noting DOJ position that state's adoption of nonretrogressive districting
plan may embody prohibited purpose under section 5 where it deemed rejected
plan to better serve minority population). The Court has suggested that agency
practice of this sort should be accorded deference as well.

See United States v.

Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2172 (2001); id. at 2184-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting);
FDIC v. Phila. Gear, 476 U.S. 426, 438-39 (1986) (according Chevron deference to
the FDIC's interpretation of statutory term "reflected in a course of unstructured
administrative actions"); see also The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, supra note 81, at 38788 (arguing that Bossier ParishH erred in refusing to accord Chevron deference to
Attorney General's construction of section 5's purpose prong).
142. See supra notes 86, 118.
143. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 372 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
144. The Rehnquist Court, of course, is not the first Court to do so. See, e.g.,
Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of
Voting Rights Jursprudence,90 MicH. L. REV. 1833, 1837 (1992) (noting "the Court
first set foot in the 'political thicket' in the 1960's"); Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest
Thicket: PartisanGerrymanderingandJudicialRegulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1325, 1325 (1987).
145. 513 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
146. Bush v. Gore, 513 U.S. 98 (2000), is said to be an unwarranted and unprecedented intrusion into state sovereignty led by the very justices who have most
celebrated state power in the decisions implementing the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution. See, e.g., Vincent Bugliosi, None Dare Call It Treason, THlE NATION,
Feb. 5, 2001, at 11; Ronald Dworkin, A Badly Hlawed Election, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs,
Jan. 11, 2001, at 53; Linda Greenhouse, Another Kind of Bitter Split, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2000, at Al; Tony Mauro, Court's Election Brawl May Leave Lasting Scars, LEGAL
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2000, at 13 (asserting Court majority usually defers to state sovereignty);Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 25, 2000, at 18.
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power. 14 7 A prime example is Shaw v. Reno14 8 and its progeny, 149 which
recognize a distinct injury under the Equal Protection Clause resulting
from the predominance of race in districting decisions. These decisions
circumscribe state power to draw electoral boundaries, and express little
15
concern for the resulting loss in state autonomy.'
147. See, e.g.,Jeffrey L. Fisher, The Unwelcome JudicialObligation to Respect Politics
in Racial GerrymanderingRemedies, 95 MicHi. L. REV. 1404, 1428-29 (1997) (arguing
that lower federal courts crafting remedies under Shaw and its progeny
"subordinate states' political concerns to other, more sterile, redistricting criteria"); Issacharoff, supra note 144, at 1835-36 (noting that "[d]espite the increased
prominence of federalist concerns" in various opinions, Court's decisions in City of
Pleasant Grove and Chisom v. Romer "dramatically enhanced federal power to regulate electoral processes"); Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 785, 786 (noting paradox
in Shaw v. Reno and its progeny that "conservative judges extend the Equal Protection Clause ...beyond the reach of precedent to significantly displace state control over legislative districting" and that decisions "offend conservative conceptions
of federalism").
148. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) [hereinafter Shaw 1].
149. See generally Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S.Ct. 1452 (2001); Shaw v. Hunt, 517
U.S. 899 (1996) [hereinafter Shaw 11];
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1996); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), is similarly illustrative. Rice struck down
as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment a state law that provided that only
"Hawaiians" could vote for trustees of the state's Office of Hawaiian Affairs
("OHA"), a public agency that oversees programs designed to benefit the State's
native people. The Court held that the restriction limiting the OHA electorate to
descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands embodied a racial
classification that denied non-Hawaiians the right to vote within the meaning of
the Fifteenth Amendment. While hardly self-evident, Rice's conclusion-that the
OHA regime involved both a racial classification and the constitutionally protected
right to vote-led the Court inexorably to its holding invalidating the voting restriction. See Katz, supra note 136, at 493-94. Along the way, Rice barely notices the
federalism costs that result from its displacement of a regime constructed by the
people of Hawaii via constitutional amendment to address and remedy historic
discrimination unique to the Hawaiian Islands. Indeed, it is noteworthy how easily
the Court displaced this local regime, which, unlike the districts at issue in cases
like Shaw and its progeny, did not bear the direct imprimatur of federal law or DOJ
involvement. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. Thus, absent from
Rice was the concern for separation of powers that informs much of the Rehnquist
Court's federalism jurisprudence. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown & Peter D. Enrich,
Nostalgic Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 23 (2000) (arguing that City of
Boerne cases are "as much about separation of powers as about federalism");
Caminker, supra note 92, at 1168-85; Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target:
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at 3. The federalism costs implicated by Rice
were thus peculiar and significant, but of only minor concern to the Court.
150. See, e.g., Shaw I, 517 U.S. at 949 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
narrow tailoring requirement in Shaw cases drastically restricts state discretion in
this realm); Bush, 517 U.S. at 1068-69 (Souter, J., dissenting); Pamela S. Karlan,
Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV.

287, 310 (1996); KOUSSER, supra note 137, at 422; Lowenstein, supra note 18, at
819; Rubin, supra note 122, at 112; see also Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 811 (suggesting that Shaw cases damage federalism values because political parties can no
longer shape districting decisions to same degree as they once did or fully derive
benefits that participation previously yielded).
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The Court's willingness to override state sovereignty to vindicate a
constitutional right cannot, however, explain its divergent assessment of
the federalism costs in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases. Neither section
5's status as congressional enforcement legislation nor an understanding
of the Constitution to proscribe either race-conscious decisionmaking or
majority-minority districts more narrowly explains the Court's approach to
federalism in the respective decisions.
1.

CongressionalEnforcement Legislation
Lopez suggests that its broad construction of section 5 vindicates rights

protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. The decision affirms that section
5's targeting of discriminatory effects through the burden shifting procedures of the preclearance process is a legitimate means for Congress to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 15' with the statutory proscription being understood to "'deter[ ] or remed[y] a constitutional violation,"' even
though the prohibited conduct does not itself violate the Constitution. 152
As valid congressional enforcement legislation, section 5 limits state sovereignty, but these federalism costs are deemed justified.
Lopez's embrace of section 5 as valid enforcement legislation is puzzling given the increasingly stringent parameters the Court has identified
as limiting congressional discretion in this realm. 15 3 The Court had, of
course, upheld congressional authority to enact section 5 before, 154 but it
had not yet addressed the constitutionality of the statute either as extended in 1982 or under City of Boerne v. Flores.155 Decided the same Term
as the College Savings Bank decisions, which developed and extended the
Boerne principles, 156 Lopez pays little attention to the factors that have become increasingly important to establishing congruence and proportionality under the developing Boerne doctrine. For example, Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court does not even mention the legislative
findings made by Congress when it amended the statute in 1982, and thus

does not assess their adequacy, despite the centrality of such determinations in the Boerne cases.'

57

Lopez instead relies on precedent that upheld

151. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 283-84 (1999) (finding "no
merit" to claim that Congress lacks constitutional authority "to require federal approval before the implementation of a state law" that may have discriminatory effect in covered jurisdiction).
152. Id. at 282-83 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997)).
153. See also supra note 6.
154. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966); City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 183 (1980); see also Guard, supra note 6, at 357
(arguing that principles of stare decisis support the Court's holding in Lopez).
155. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
156. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999). See generally Caminker, supra note 92, at 114749 (discussing
application of City of Boerne in College Savings Bank cases).
157. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 964-66
(2001) (finding inadequate legislative findings underlying abrogation of state sov-
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earlier versions of section 5 based on distinct legislative findings and his1 58
toric circumstances.
The Court in Lopez is nevertheless confident that section 5, as broadly
construed in the case, constitutes valid enforcement legislation vindicating
rights protected by the Constitution. To the extent, however, that this understanding of section 5 explains Lopez's dismissal of the resulting federalism costs, it should have dictated contrary holdings in the Bossier Parish
cases, both of which likewise construe section 5. The Court in Bossier Parish I remains nevertheless unmoved not only by section 5's status as valid
enforcement legislation, but also by section 2's,159 and instead invokes federalism as a reason to order preclearance of a change that violates section
2.160 Even more puzzling in this regard, Bossier ParishII rejects a construction of section 5 that would have blocked implementation of a patently
unconstitutional change, all the while asserting that the rejected construc16 1
tion was constitutionally suspect.
2.

Colorblindness and the Majority-Minority District

The Rehnquist Court, at times, has suggested the Reconstruction
Amendments promote colorblind decisionmaking, 162 and individual jusereign immunity in Americans with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598, 626-27 (2000) (invalidating § 13,981 of Violence Against Women Act
and noting that "Congress' findings indicate that the problem of gender-motivated
crimes does not exist in all States, or even in most States"); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000) (finding inadequate legislative findings underlying abrogation of state immunity in Age Discrimination in Employment Act); F/a.
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641, 645-46 (noting that record documented few instances of
patent infringements by States); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act and noting that documented instances of statesponsored bigotry dated back more than forty years).
158. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282-84 (1999); see also Rome,
446 U.S. at 180-82 (discussing findings underlying 1975 extension of VRA); Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-09 (noting voluminous congressional findings).
159. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and its progeny cast doubt on whether
section 2 constitutes valid congressional enforcement legislation. See, e.g., Heather
K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HAv. L. REv. 1663,
1737 (2001); Guard, supra note 6, at 359-63; Karlan, supra note 6, at 728-40; IsSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 16, at 859-66; David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things
Differently: Boerne v. Flores and CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997
Sup. Cr. REv. 31, 45; Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores,
39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 749-50 (1998); DanielJ. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2544 (1998).
Bossier Parish I, however, predates City of Boerne, makes no reference to the
question of section 2's constitutional validity, and contains nothing to suggest that
concern about the adequacy of congressional authority to enact section 2 informed the Court's construction of section 5.
160. See Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997).
161. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 336 (2000).
162. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000) (discussing Fifteenth
Amendment's "mandate of neutrality"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904
(1995) (noting that "central mandate" of Equal Protection Clause "is racial neutrality in governmental decisionmaking").
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tices have read the amendments to require it. 163 An understanding of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to mandate colorblindness, while
debatable on its merits,1 64 offers a coherent basis to invalidate racially163. The most ardent devotees of the concept are Justice Scalia, see, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that "government can never
have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to
'make up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction"); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(same);Justice Thomas, see, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment) (disagreeing "that strict scrutiny is not invoked by the
intentional creation of majority-minority districts"); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
891 (1994) (Thomas,J., concurring); see also Thomas L. Jipping,Judge Thomas Is the
First Choice: The Case for Clarence Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 397, 447 (19992000) (noting statement by then judge--Thomas that "I firmly insist that the Constitution be interpreted in a colorblind fashion"); and Justice Kennedy. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1027 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Metro Broad.
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing "the
cardinal rule that our Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a
member of a group"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (noting that "[t]he moral imperative of racial neutrality
is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause").
More receptive to claims that incorporate some consideration of race are Justice O'Connor, see, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie,121 S. Ct. 1452, 1459 (2001) (discussing
how racial identification is linked with political affiliation); Bush, 517 U.S. at 95859, 962; id. at 993 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (stressing plaintiffs must show state "relied on race in substantial
disregard of customary and traditional districting practices"); see also Samuel Issacharoff, ConstitutionalContours of Race, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 45, 63 (1995); Melissa
L. Saunders, ReconsideringShaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting,109 YALE
L.J. 1603, 1614 (2000); and Chief Justice Rehnquist. See Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice,

521 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1997) (a 5-4 decision with ChiefJustice Rehnquist voting in
the majority to uphold districting plan that was racially informed but found not to
subordinate traditional districting principles to race); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. at 958
(stating, in plurality opinion joined by ChiefJustice, that "[s]trict scrutiny does not
apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of race[,] ...
[n]or does it apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts");Johnsonv. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 999 (1994) (ChiefJustice joining majority to reject section 2 challenge to racially-informed districting plan containing
numerous majority-minority districts); KOUSSER, supra note 137, at 436; Saunders,
supra, at 1613 n.50. But cf Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, NEW REPUBLIC, July
31, 1995, at 19 (placing Chief Justice with Justices Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas,
and arguing that all believe that government "can almost never classify citizens
based on race").
164. Compare ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 53-66 (1992);
Neil Gotanda, A Critiqueof "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 1-5
(1991); Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness,96
Mici. L. REV. 245, 247 (1997); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985), with STEPHAN T.
THERNSTROM

& ABIGAIL M.

THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NA-

492 (1997); James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and Vote
Dilution: Shaw v. Reno in DoctrinalContext, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 519 (1995); Katharine Inglis Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: FairRepresentationfor Minorities
or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS LJ. 595, 599-600 (1995);
Charles J. Cooper, The Coercive Remedies Paradox, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 77, 77
(1986).
TION INDIVISIBLE
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informed state action and thereby circumscribe state power. 165 This understanding cannot, however, explain the Court's assessment of federalism
costs in Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases, as all three decisions promote
race-conscious decisionmaking by covered jurisdictions.
Both Lopez and Bossier Parish I promote race-conscious decisionmaking of the sort that necessarily results from compliance with the VRA and
any law barring racially discriminatory effects. Such prohibitions require
those governed by them to consider race expressly or risk violating the
proscription.'6" The coverage designation established in Lopez means that
the County must prove that its new electoral regime does not have an impermissible purpose or effect. The only way to demonstrate the latter is
for the County to assess expressly how the switch from a district-based system to an at-large one affects the interests of racial minorities. A covered
jurisdiction cannot prove this effect is absent without taking race into account. 167 Bossier ParishI similarly discourages colorblindness. To be sure,
the decision postpones, and at times will eliminate,' 6 8 the racially-informed evaluation of an electoral rule under section 2's results test. But
by relying on retrogression as the measure of a section 5 effect, the decision also accepts and indeed requires functionally analogous race-conscious decisionmaking by covered jurisdictions.
The explanatory failure of colorblindness is most evident, however, in
Bossier ParishII, where the Court expressly rejected a construction of section 5 that would have blocked racially informed decisionmaking in favor
of one that permits it. Unlike section 5's effect prong, its purpose prong
165. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 92, at 1194 (stating that "[t]he Reconstruc-

tion Amendments in general, and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular,
worked a significant shift in the federal-state balance of power, as part of which the
states waived various features of their erstwhile sovereign status"); Victor W. Rotnem, Enforcement of Civil Rights, 3 NAT'L B.J. 1, 4 (1945) (noting that Reconstruction Era amendments "drastically altered the earlier balance of power between the
states and the Federal government").
166. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 825 (noting that under both section 2 and section 5 of VRA "race is a privileged criterion" and that "[t]he legislature and everyone who participates in the process must begin with race"); Lisa
Erickson, Comment, The Impact of the Supreme Court's Criticism of the Justice Depart-

ment in Miller v. Johnson, 65 Miss. L.J. 409, 421 (1995) (noting that section 5 requires covered jurisdictions to "consider race in implementing new voting
practices in order to achieve equal opportunity in voting rights"); cf. Ragin v. N.Y.
Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1000, 1001 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing how Fair Housing Act's
effect-based ban on racial preference in advertisements permissibly leads to raceconscious decisionmaking).
The Rehnquist Court generally has been unpersuaded by the contention that
seemingly benignly-motivated, racially-informed decisionmaking is different in
kind from that motivated by racial animus. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21
(1995); Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986).
167. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 122, at 107 (describing Court's "implicit recognition that race-based districting to avoid retrogression may well be required to
satisfy the effect prong of section 5 preclearance scrutiny").
168. See infra note 189.
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does not inherently require that jurisdictions engage in race-conscious
decisionmaking. Justice Scalia nevertheless reads section 5 to permit coveredjurisdictions not only to consider race, but also to discriminate invidiously based on race, so long as they do not hold a retrogressive intent. 169
A commitment to colorblindness accordingly cannot explain the
Court's assessment of federalism costs in Lopez and the BossierParishcases.
Similarly, the sentiment that the Constitution bars the majority-minority
district, as a distinct subset of racially informed decisionmaking, also fails
as an explanation. The Rehnquist Court repeatedly has held that, at the
behest of DOJ, 170 or by the apparent command of the Court's own precedent, 17 1 jurisdictions have employed the majority-minority district far
more broadly than Congress ever intended when it amended the VRA in
1982 and indeed beyond what the Constitution permits. 172 Many of the
justices appear convinced that the majority-minority district represents
bad policy, 173 and some suspect, or indeed believe, that the intentional
creation of a majority-minority district, under any circumstances, violates
169. See Bossier Parish 11, 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000).
170. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
171. SeeJohnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (noting that "society's racial and ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority districts
to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity"); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952,
977 (1996) (assuming, without deciding, that compliance with section 2 can be a
compelling interest); Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (same); Miller, 515 U.S. at
920-21; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 69 (1986); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
at 990-92 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (stating that compliance with § 2 is compelling interest).
172. See Shaw I, 517 U.S. at 915-18; Bushv. Vera, 517 U.S. at 977-83; Miller, 515
U.S. 900; Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630.
173. See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 927 ("[E]qual opportunity to gain public office regardless of race ... is neither assured nor well served ... by carving electorates into racial blocs."); id. at 911-12 ("When the State assigns voters on the basis of
race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that voters of a particular race, because of their race, 'think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls."' (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647));
Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1020 (recognizing that majority-minority districts may "sometimes" be necessary "to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity," but emphasizing that such districts embody "'the politics of second best,' and should be
avoided whenever diverse ethnic and racial coalitions are possible"); Holder v.
Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 892, 903, 905, 907 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing
that majority-minority districts represent "racial 'balkanization' of the Nation," that
they "segregat[e] the races into political homelands that amount[ ], in truth, to
nothing short of a system of 'political apartheid;' that they give "credence to the
view that race defines political interest," and that "few devices could be better designed to exacerbate racial tensions that the consciously segregated districting system currently being constructed in the name of the Voting Rights Act" (quoting
Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647, 658)); see also Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of PoliticalPower
and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 112, 121 (2000) (describing
position that self-conscious creation of majority-minority districts "expresses a view
of political identity inconsistent with democratic ideals . . . [and] might have the
consequentialist effect of encouraging citizens and representatives increasingly to
come to experience and define their political identities and interests in partial
terms").
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the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 174 While the contours of any
such constitutional injury have not been developed, the justices' evident
preference for the influence district over the majority-minority district suggests they understand the latter to produce a harm distinct from that they
associate with the race-consciousness that informs the creation of both
types of districts. 175 That this harm may be of constitutional dimension
finds circumstantial support in the fact that the only two Court decisions
to uphold after argument a racially informed district against a Shaw chal176
lenge both involved districts that were not majority-minority.
But even if the Court were convinced that the majority-minority district gives rise to a distinct harm cognizable under the Reconstruction
Amendments and thus that the need to curb the creation of such districts
warrants encroachments into state sovereignty, such a conviction cannot
explain its divergent assessment of federalism costs in Lopez and the Bossier
Parish cases. To be sure, had the Court construed section 5 to block the
Bossier Parish School Board from implementing its districting plan, either
because the plan violated section 2 or because the Board acted with a discriminatory, albeit not retrogressive, purpose, the decision would have
caused the Board to adopt either the NAACP's plan or some other plan
containing one, and likely two, majority-minority districts. 177 And yet, the
Court's construction of the statute in Lopez, while not directly requiring
the County to create majority-minority districts, opened the door to such a
mandate. Holding section 5 applicable to the county ordinances meant
that the County needed to submit the changes for preclearance before it
could implement them. Given that those ordinances replaced a district174. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 801 (stating that "majority of the
majority [in the Shaw cases] regards the intentional creation of [a majority-minority district] as presumptively unconstitutional" but that majority of Court does
not).
175. See, e.g., Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1020 (expressing this preference); see also
Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. 471, 491 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that
increasing number of majority-minority districts "necessarily decreases the level of minority influence in surrounding districts, and to that extent 'dilutes' the vote of
minority voters in those other districts, and perhaps dilutes the influence of the
minority group as a whole"); Holder, 512 U.S. at 900-01 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing influence districts); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154-155 (1993)
(noting potential differences between majority-minority and influence districts).
The harm, accordingly, stems not from race-consciousness itself, but from the
perception that too much reliance on race in districting decisions thwarts the
meaningful exercise of the vote. Cf Katz, supra note 136, at 525-26 (suggesting
that justices joining majority opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), disagree with those concurring about when reliance on race in districting becomes
excessive).
176. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452, 1457 (2001) (noting district's
"heavily African-American (47%) voting population"); Lawyer v. Dept. of Justice,
521 U.S. 567, 571-73 (1997) (noting that district's population declined from 45%
African-American in first plan to 36.2% in revised plan). But cf. DeWitt v. Wilson,
515 U.S. 1170 (1995) (summarily affirming constitutionality of majority-minority
district challenged under Shaw).
177. See Bossier Parish 11, 528 U.S. 320, 323 (2000).
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based electoral regime with an at-large system, a denial of preclearance
could easily have led to a district-based system containing at least some
majority-minority districts. 178 Notwithstanding this possibility, Lopez
adopts the broad construction of section 5 and accepts the federalism
costs that result.
C.

InstitutionalOverreachingat the PreclearanceHurdle

Lopez and the Bossier Parish cases construe different components of
the preclearance statute. Lopez concerns a question of coverage, namely
whether preclearance was required at all, while the BossierParishcases address the substantive standard for obtaining preclearance. The VRA vests
a federal three-judge panel with jurisdiction to assess coverage questions,
while it provides DOJ, along with the federal district for the District of
Columbia, with authority to review the substance of preclearance
1 79
submissions.
This division of authority may best explain the Court's differing assessment of federalism costs in the respective decisions. The Rehnquist
Court has long been convinced that DOJ has abused its authority in administering the preclearance process and has intruded unjustifiably in
state sovereign processes. 180 The Bossier Parishcases rely on retrogression
with the unstated hope that the concept will curb the opportunities for
what the Court sees as institutional overreaching by DOJ and the unjustified federalism costs it produces. Lopez, by contrast, did not directly implicate conduct by DOJ, addressing instead the coverage question. DOJ has
no say on this question, and thus while the consequence of the decision is
to render more conduct subject to preclearance and thus to DOJ review, 8" the Court in Lopez had no opportunity to confront directly DOJ
conduct and thus readily accepted the federalism costs that followed from
its broad construction of section 5.
At issue in Lopez was whether the County was "seek[ing] to administer" a voting change within the meaning of the Act.' 82 The Rehnquist
Court, with one major exception,18 3 has construed section 5 broadly when
178. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 272-74 (1999).
179. See supra note 16.
180. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
181. See infra text following note '221.
182. Lopez, 525 U.S. at 278.
183. The major exception is Presley v. Etowah County Commission, which held
section 5 inapplicable to laws altering the powers exercised by elected county commissioners, where the laws had been adopted after voting rights litigation resulted
in structural changes to the respective commissions and the election of AfricanAmerican commissioners. 502 U.S. 491, 496, 498 (1992); see id. at 522 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 179-80
(1994); Rubin, supra note 122, at 64 n.181. Presley holds that applying section 5 to
such changes would work "an unconstrained expansion of its coverage," given that
"innumerable" local enactments affect the power of elected officials. See Presley,
502 U.S. at 504. Distinguishing precedent, see id. at 506-07 (stating that Allen v.
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confronted with coverage questions of this sort. These cases expand the
types of decisions subject to preclearance and stiffen the penalties for a
jurisdiction's failure to obtain it, 184 all the while paying scant attention to
the federalism costs that result. 18 5 At the same time, however, the Court
State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569-70 (1969), which held, inter alia, that decision to make previously elected position appointive must be precleared, was not
controlling because voters in Presley retained ability to elect official, albeit one with
lesser and different powers), and disregarding the Attorney General's contrary
construction, see id. at 508-09, Presley states that localities must be able to allocate
power among officials without federal interference; otherwise efficient and responsible governance would be sacrificed. See id. at 510.
City of Monroe v. United States likewise represents an exception to the Court's
general tendency to construe section 5 broadly in coverage cases. Monroeheld that
a covered city may enforce a majority vote requirement despite the unprecleared
status of the law instituting it, because the Attorney General had precleared a subsequent state law creating the majority vote requirement as a default rule. See 522
U.S. 34, 39 (1997) (per curiam). City of Rome v. United States reached the opposite
conclusion where the municipality's charter originally called for a plurality vote
and an unprecleared 1966 change sought to establish a majority vote requirement.
See 446 U.S. 156, 169 n.6 (1980). Monroe's facts paralleled Rome's but for the fact
that Monroe's charter was silent regarding the majority-plurality question, with the
city adhering in practice to a plurality vote rule. The Court in Monroe held that the
absence of an express charter provision meant the already-precleared state default
rule governed, and thus that Monroe could enforce the majority vote rule without
obtaining preclearance of its 1966 charter amendment. See Monroe, 522 U.S. at 39.
184. The Court has, for example, unanimously held that judicial elections
held pursuant to unprecleared statutes should have been enjoined, see Clark v.
Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 652 (1991), and, prospectively, that elections may not be
held tinder an unprecleared system, even when the result may be to leave the
jurisdiction without an electoral system. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9,
22-23 (1996). The Court has unanimously held that a State's failure to obtain
preclearance is not cured by the preclearance of later or related changes, see
Clark, 500 U.S. at 655, or changes not enumerated in the submission. See Foreman
v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979, 980 (1997) (per curiam). But see Monroe, 522 U.S.
34; supra note 183. The Rehnquist Court was unanimous in requiring
preclearance for discretionary decisions made pursuant to a precleared statute, see
id. at 980; as well as for a State's implementation of separate registration systems
for federal and state elections after the enactment of the National Voter Registration Act. See Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 290 (1997).
Over dissenting votes, moreover, the Court has held the section 5
preclearance requirement applicable to a decision to annex uninhabited land, see
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 471 (1987); cf Bossier Parish
I1, 528 U.S. 320, 33940 (2000) (reading Pleasant Grove to understand discriminatory purpose under section 5 to be retrogressive purpose), to a party-initiated filing
fee for participation in the state party's nominating convention, see Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 201 (1995), and to voting-related measures
mandated by a noncovered State, even when the jurisdiction exercises no discretion in giving effect to the change. See Lopez, 525 U.S. at 280.
185. See, e.g., Lopez, 519 U.S. at 24 (acknowledging that its construction of
section 5 might well leave jurisdiction without electoral system, but stating simply
that "[t] he County has not discharged its obligation" tinder statute, and that "the
requirement of federal scrutiny should be satisfied without further delay"); Clark,
500 U.S. at 660 (instructing district court to fashion remedy that "implemented the
mandate of § 5 in the most equitable and practicable way with least offense to its
provisions," and expressing no explicit concern for any resulting disruption in
state processes); Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 468 (responding to dissent's charge that
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has construed se&ion 5 narrowly when assessing the substantive standard
the statute requires covered jurisdictions to meet before implementing an
electoral change. These decisions significantly lower the hurdle to obtaining preclearance, 18 6 and emphasize the federalism costs that a higher
187
hurdle would generate.
underlying facts did not warrant application of section 5's "unusual intrusion ...
on state sovereignty" by affirming the Court's commitment to give the statute "'the
broadest possible scope"') (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
567 (1969)).
186. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text. On this point, Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), is a precursor of sorts to Bossier Parish II. In Miller,
DOJ maintained that Georgia's initial failure to create a plan with three majorityminority districts reflected a discriminatory purpose under section 5 and was therefore a ground for a denial of preclearance. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 923-24. The
Court disagreed, holding that Georgia's ultimate adoption of a districting plan
with three majority-black districts reflected not the dictates of section 5, but the
DOJ's so-called "black-maximization" policy. See id. at 925; see also Lowenstein,
supra note 18, at 813 (agreeing with Court that original state plan submitted to
DOJ should have been precleared). And yet, as Professor Rubin has explained,
Georgia's plan did not maximize the number of majority-minority districts and
instead created a number roughly proportional to the state's African-American
population. See Rubin, supra note 122, at 106 (noting that State could have created
as many as five black-minority districts). While Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1014 (1994), rejected a section 2 challenge because the plan in dispute achieved
rough proportionality-that is, it afforded minority voters the opportunity to exercise electoral control in a number of districts roughly proportional to their share
of the population-and Bossier ParishI suggests that evidence of a section 2 violation is relevant to discriminatory purpose under section 5, see Bossier Parish 1, 520
U.S. 471, 486-91 (1997), Miller, laying the groundwork for Bossier Parish11, accordingly suggests that a failure to achieve rough proportionality does not inform the
inquiry into section 5's prohibited purpose. Miller, 515 U.S. at 924. Like both
Bossier Parish decisions, Miller invoked "the federalism costs exacted by section 5
preclearance" as justification. See id. at. 926-27.
Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), likewise construes section 5 narrowly.
Abrams was not technically a section 5 case at all, given that it involved a courtdevised redistricting plan which need not be precleared. See Connor v. Johnson,
402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971) (per curiam). Nevertheless, the Court has held that the
preclearance standards should inform the judicial redistricting process. See
Abrams, 521 U.S. at 95; McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 149 (1981). Hence the
plaintiffs in Abrams charged that the district court's plan was retrogressive within
the meaning of section 5. See Abrams, 521 U.S. at 95. The Court, however, found
no violation of section 5 where a redistricting plan, like its predecessor, contained
a single black-majority district. See id. at 97-98; see also id. at 96-97 (noting dispute
about whether appropriate benchmark was last precleared plan that included single black-majority district or subsequent, unprecleared plan containing two such
districts). The Court deemed this result nonretrogressive even though the increased size of the State's congressional delegation after the 1990 census meant
that the black-majority district went from representing one-tenth of the State's delegation in the original plan to one-eleventh of the delegation under the new plan.
See id. at 97; see also Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the
2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. R~v. 731, 749 (1998) (arguing that district court's plan
left state's African-American population "quantitatively worse off').
187. See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 336 (noting federalism costs of broader
construction); BossierParishI, 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997) (same); Abrams, 521 U.S. at
96-97 (adopting narrow understanding of retrogression to preserve state discretion
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This approach to section 5 suggests that the Court thinks the statute's
federalism costs are incurred disproportionately at the preclearance hurdle. The reason, however, is not that the Court deems the burden imposed by the coverage designation to be inconsequential.1 8 8 Lopez itself
illustrates how intrusive a coverage designation can be. The decision
delayed the uniform implementation of statewide policy and left Califor-

nia, a jurisdiction not subject to the preclearance requirement, confronting the prospect that such implementation would be permanently
blocked. 189 Recognizing the intrusiveness of its holding, Lopez does not
dispute Justice Thomas' statement in his dissent that "section[ I] [5's] interference with state sovereignty is quite drastic-covered States and political subdivisions may not give effect to their policy choices affecting voting
without first obtaining the Federal Government's approval."' 911 Indeed,
Lopez expressly acknowledges the "substantial 'federalism costs"' resulting
from the VRA's "federal intrusion into sensitive areas of state and local
over districting and refusing to construe section 5 to require that "each time a
State with a majority-minority district was allowed to add one new district because
of population growth, it would have to be majority-minority"); Miller, 515 U.S. at
926-27 (noting "federalism costs exacted by section 5 preclearance").
188. See, e.g., Bossier ParishII, 528 U.S. at 335 (noting "extraordinary burdenshifting procedures of § 5"); Blanding v. Dubose, 454 U.S. 393, 402 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing preclearance process as "effort to please a distant
authority with veto power over the decisions of local officials," and stating that
localities are "at the mercy of attorneys in the Justice Department"); City of Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 (1980) (Powell,J., dissenting) (stating that statute's encroachment on state sovereignty is "especially troubling because it destroys
local control of the means of self-government, one of the central values of our
polity"); United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing encroachment on state sovereignty as "significant
and undeniable"); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358-60 (1966)
(Black, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that section 5 "distorts our constitutional structure of government"); see also supra note 18.
189. In terms of intrusiveness, Lopez appears at least commensurate to the
Bossier Parish cases, where the respective holdings offer covered jurisdictions a reprieve, but not necessarily an escape from liability under section 2 and the Constitution itself. See also Abrams, 521 U.S. at 96-98 (upholding narrow construction of
section 5 that left State potentially subject to liability under section 2). To be sure,
the burden of proof in these latter actions and the time and cost of litigation allow
covered jurisdictions to implement and potentially retain measures that a broader
construction of section 5's preclearance hurdle would immediately block. See, e.g.,
Alaina C. Beverly, Lowering the PreclearanceHurdle, Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 5
MICH. J. RACE & L. 695 (2000) (making this point); cf Charlotte Marx Harper, A
Promisefor Litigation: Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board, 52 BAYLOR L. REv. 647,
660 (2000) (arguing that after Bossier Parish cases, preclearance no longer establishes nondiscriminatory character of districting plan and thus that precleared
plans are now "more vulnerable to challenge under section 2"). That flexibility is
significant, but it remains flexible to violate federal law, be it section 2 of the VRA
or the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court's insistence on preserving state autonomy to do so is puzzling given its acceptance of the encroachments
upheld by the coverage designation in Lopez.
190. Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 294 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).

1212

VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46: p. 1179

policymaking."191 And while Lopez holds this intrusion to be warranted,
the Court in Presley v. Etowah County Commission' 9 2 deemed coverage to be
too invasive if applied to resolutions that altered the powers exercised by
elected county officials. 193 "If federalism is to operate as a practical system
of governance and not a mere poetic ideal," Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court, "States must be allowed both predictability and efficiency in struc94
turing their governments."'
But while the Court deems the federalism costs of coverage to be significant, it thinks that those costs are more likely to be justified than those
incurred at the preclearance hurdle. The reason is the Rehnquist Court's
dissatisfaction with the conduct of DOJ in assessing preclearance submissions.19 5 In the Court's view, DOJ has spent more than a decade implementing a "black maximization" policy, under which it has required
covered jurisdictions to draw the maximum number of black-majority districts possible, regardless of their contours or the communities of interest
they encompass. In pursuit of this "policy," DOJ is said to have denied
preclearance based on unreasonable constructions of section 5,196 im191. Id. at 282 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926 (1995)).
192. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
193. Etowah County's "Common Fund Resolution" ended the County's prior
practice of allowing each county commissioner full authority over funds allocated
to the commissioner's road district. A second resolution, passed the same day,
allowed the holdover members of the newly restructured Commission to retain
control over district road shops and control jointly all repair and construction
work. The two new commissioners were given separate responsibilities. See Presley,
502 U.S. at 496-97. Russell County's "Unit System" abolished individual road districts and transferred authority over them to an appointed official, giving the
elected officials different responsibilities. See id. at 499.
194. Id. at 510.
195. Criticism of this sort is not a new phenomenon. See, e.g., Blanding v.
Dubose, 454 U.S. 393, 401-03 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting "the unreasonably burdensome and unrealistic control which the Federal Government
routinely exercises over state and local governments under the Voting Rights Act;"
that "the record "portrays a particularly frustrating effort to please a distant authority with veto power over the decisions of local officials;" that localities are "at the
mercy of attorneys in the Justice Department;" and that "[t] here seems to be something inherently unsatisfactory about a system which places such discretionary authority in the hands of a few unelected federal officials who are wholly detached
from the realities of the locality and the preferences of the local electorate.").
196. See, e.g., Shaw II, 517 U.S. 899, 913 (1996) (stating that "[i]t appears that
the Justice Department was pursuing in North Carolina the same policy of maximizing the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia"); id. (noting that Court "again reject[s] the Department's expansive interpretation of § 5");
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 921 (1995) (noting that "compliance with federal
antidiscrimination law cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged
district was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws"); id. at 924 (noting that "[i] nstead of grounding its objections
on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would appear the Government was
driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts"); id. at 925 (stating that
"[i]n utilizing § 5 to require States to create majority-minority districts wherever
possible, the Department of justice expanded its authority beyond what Congress
intended and we have upheld").
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properly skewed state districting processes, and forced localities to adopt
19 7
unconstitutional majority-minority districts.
The Bossier Parishcases are informed by these views. To be sure, the
opinions do not contain the biting criticism of DOJ that is prevalent in
other decisions; no allegation was raised suggesting that the Board could
not constitutionally draw the majority-minority districts sought by the
NAACP, 198 and the Board itself subsequently acknowledged that the plan
it adopted diluted the voting strength of the Parish's black population.' 99
Even so, the Bossier Parish decisions reflect the skepticism with which the
Court views DOJ conduct in this realm. Both decisions emphasize the fact
that the Attorney General refused to preclear the Board's plan, even
though she had already precleared the identical police jury plan, and that
this refusal was based on "new information" indicating that majority-minority districts could be drawn. 2° ° Both decisions pointedly refuse to defer to the Attorney General's construction of the statute, despite the
197. See, e.g.,
Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 85-86 (1997) (noting that Georgia legislature had "yielded to the Justice Department's threats, [and] it also
adopted the Justice Department's entirely race-focused approach to redistrictingthe max-black policy"); id. at 86 (noting that "the State was subjected to steady
Justice Department pressure to create the maximum number of majority-black districts"); id. at 87 (finding "strong support... for finding the second majority-black
district . ..resulted in substantial part from the Justice Department's policy of
creating the maximum number of majority-black districts"); Miller, 515 U.S. at 917
(noting evidence of State's "predominant, overriding desire" to create three black
majority districts to satisfy Department ofJustice); see alsoJohnson v. Miller, 922 F.
Supp. 1556, 1560 (S.D. Ga. 1995), affd sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74
("Georgia's current plan was not the product of Georgia's legislative will. Rather,
the process producing Georgia's current plan was tainted by unconstitutional DOJ
interference"); id. at 1563 (noting Department ofJustice's "subversion of the redistricting process" since the 1990 census); Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 780, 804-05,
813 (noting that Department of Justice "forced" covered jurisdictions to create
specific number of majority-minority districts and withheld preclearance unless
they complied); O'Rourke, supra note 115, at 750 (arguing that "the legal foundation for the Justice Department's demand that North Carolina and Louisiana craft
two majority black districts or that Georgia draw three black districts is, at best,
dubious"); Abigail Thernstrom, More Notes From a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY LJ.
911, 930 (1995) (noting concern "over the Justice Department's coercive role in
bending local jurisdiction to its will" and that Voting Rights Section "has long assumed freewheeling power to object to districting plans that did not seem 'right'that is, racially 'fair"'). But see Rubin, supra note 122, at 105-06 (disputing Court's
characterization of DOJ's conduct); Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black
Backlash and the Endangered Two-Party Paradigm, 48 DUKE L.J. 1, 30-31 (1998) (suggesting that the DOJ conduct disputed in Abrams v. Johnson was appropriate); ThaliaL. Downing Carroll, Casenote, One Step Fonard or Two Steps Back? Abrams v.
Johnson and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 917, 944-45 (1998)

(same).
198. The dispute concerning the NAACP's plan concerned not whether it ran
afoul of Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, but whether the Board's claim that the plan
impermissibly split precincts and thus could not be implemented was pretextual.

See Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 355 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

199. See id. at 343.
200. See id. at 324; Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 475 (1997).
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traditional deference accorded to that view. 2111 BossierParishI additionally
holds that a section 2 violation is not reason to deny preclearance based,
in part, on the suggestion that DOJ would exploit the authority that would
20 2
inhere in this "new reason for denying preclearance."
This skepticism shaped the Court's holding that retrogression defines
the full scope of a section 5 injury. Bossier Parish I refuses to construe
section 5 to include a section 2 violation because doing so would "change
the § 5 benchmark from a jurisdiction's existing plan to a hypothetical,
undiluted plan." 203 Bossier Parish1!, likewise, holds that retrogression fully
defines a section 5 violation because construing the statute more broadly
to include intentional dilution or other sorts of nonretrogressive purposive discrimination would require a comparison not with the status quo,
but with the hypothetical alternative "of an undiluted vote. '20 4 Both decisions suggest that measuring discrimination against such a hypothetical
benchmark would intrude too deeply into state sovereignty, 2 115 and both
do so, at least in part, because the Court doubts the ability of DOJ to con201. See supra notes 94, 118 and 141 and accompanying text.
202. BossierParish1, 520 U.S. at 477 (noting that "we entertain little doubt that
the Department of Justice or other litigants would 'routinely' attempt to avail
themselves of this new reason for denying preclearance, so that recognizing § 2
violations as a basis for denying § 5 preclearance would inevitably make compliance with § 5 contingent upon compliance with § 2"); cf id. at 502 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (stating that "[t] here is no basis for the
Court's speculation that litigants would so 'routinely' . . . employ a 10-year-old
regulation" in this manner).
203. Id. at 480.
204. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 324.
205. See id. at 336; Bossier Parish 1, 520 U.S. at 480. In this regard, the Bossier
Parishcases may be distinguished from Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S.
491 (1992), andJustice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874
(1994), both of which turn on the Court's conclusion that no benchmark, hypothetical or otherwise, could be discerned, as opposed to its concern that the entity
charged with discerning the benchmark lacks the competence to do so. Presley
repeatedly notes the absence of a workable standard for designating covered
changes were the Court to hold section 5 applicable to changes in the substantive
authority of elected officials. See Preshy, 502 U.S. at 504 (noting that "[s] ome standard is necessary" and that "[a] faithful effort to implement the design of the statute must begin by drawing lines"); id. at 505 (stating that "appellants fail to give
any workable standard to determine when preclearance is required"). So too, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Holder v. Hall holds section 2 inapplicable to a
challenge brought by black voters against county governance by a single county
commissioner. While the suit alleged that, if the County replaced the single member executive with a multi-person commission, the county's black voters could constitute a majority in one of five single-member districts, and that other counties
had adopted such five-member commissions, the plurality holds the absence of a
meaningful benchmark against which to assess dilution to be dispositive. See
Holder, 512 U.S. at 881 (noting that "[t]here is no principled reason why one size
should be picked over another as the benchmark for comparison"). Justice
Thomas' concurrence, joined by justice Scalia, would have held section 2 inapplicable to vote dilution altogether, based on the view that an objective measure for
designating undiluted voting strength is absent. See id. at 892 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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duct these measurements. While not unbounded, 20 6 claims of racial vote
dilution are notoriously complex for both plaintiffs and defendants litigating them and for the courts adjudicating them. 2 07 The BossierParishcases
suggest the Court's conviction that DOJ lacks the competence to judge
when the totality of circumstances establish racial vote dilution. More precisely, the Court fears that if section 5 transcends retrogression to encompass vote dilution and other forms of nonretrogressive discrimination,
DOJ will use this "new reason" to deny preclearance to "maximize" the
creation of black-majority districts, and thereby to impose unwarranted
20 8
federalism costs on covered jurisdictions.
This fear was not allayed by the fact that the federal district court in
the District of Columbia, an entity whose competence the Court has not
questioned in this context, is also authorized to review preclearance submissions. 20 9 DOJ processes the vast majority of preclearance requests submitted, 2 10 and covered jurisdictions often lack the time and resources to
seek review in the district court. 2 11 The Bossier Parish decisions seek to
restrict the discretion exercised by DOJ in this process, but the holdings
necessarily limit the discretion exercised by the federal district court as
well. The VRA requires that DOJ and the district court administer the
same standard, such that the Court could not curb the discretion of one
without restricting that of the other as well.
206. See supra note 58; see also S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (listing factors informing totality of circumstances inquiry under section 2); Gerken, supra note 159,
at 1171-76.
207. See, e.g., Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Perhaps in
no other area of the law is as much specificity in reasoning and fact finding reqtired, as shown by our frequent remands of voting dilution cases to district
courts."), vacated and remanded in light of amended section 2, 460 U.S. 1065
(1983); James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community, and the ConstitutionalStructure of Political Influence: A Reconsiderationof the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 971 (1997)
(noting that resolving claims "about the actualability of individuals and groups to
use the political process to protect themselves and their interests . . . [can] be
extremely complex and factually messy"); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Not By "Election"Alone, 32 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1173, 1182 (1999) (noting that minority
vote dilution cases "led the courts into complex fields of effective representation,
fair distribution of governmental services, and finally, equitable allocation of governmental power").
208. But see The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, supra note 81, at 428 (arguing that
Bossier Parish I "rested almost entirely on grounds other than federalism").
209. See supra note 16.
210. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 52, 53 n.2 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) (citing Justice Department statistics); Hiroshi Motomura,
Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 191
(1983).
211. See Richard Briffault, Race and RepresentationAfter Miller v. Johnson, 1995
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 79-81 (1995) (discussing incentives for covered jurisdictions to
seek preclearance from Attorney General instead of district court); Lowenstein,
supra note 18, at 814 (stating that covered jurisdictions prefer to seek preclearance
from Attorney General than from district court because DOJ generally acts more
quickly and will negotiate with jurisdictions).
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The Court accordingly hoped that by relying on retrogression to define the preclearance standard in the Bossier Parishcases it would reduce
what it sees as unwarranted federalism costs produced by DOJ overreaching.2 12 The statute's intrusion into state sovereignty can, after all, only be
justified when the various federal actors that oversee the Act operate lawfully within their designated roles.
Lopez might likewise be understood to curb the authority of a federal
actor implementing the preclearance process. By holding nondiscretionary changes to be covered by section 5, Lopez narrows the inquiry pursued
by the three-judge panel charged with assessing coverage questions. Had
the Court held otherwise, coverage panels would thereafter confront questions whether a particular change involved a discretionary judgment, a
complex question, as Lopez itself demonstrates, given the intricate intersections between local and state authority. 2 13 The holding in Lopez, consequently, left to coverage panels the relatively circumscribed task of
assessing whether a particular change was one with respect to voting, regardless of whether it involved discretionary judgments.
The previous failure, moreover, of the three-judge panel to adhere to
its designated task had already provoked criticism by the Court in its first
decision in Lopez. Recall that after the County was unable to establish that
its at-large system satisfied section 5 in proceedings before the federal district court in the District of Columbia, it returned to the threejudge panel
in the Northern District of California, which oversaw efforts by the parties

to develop a new districting plan, and subsequently ordered that elections
be held under the original, unprecleared plan. 2 14 Reversing that ruling,
the Court's first Lopez decision recognized that its holding threatened to
leave the County without a judicial election system. 2 15 The Court placed
blame for this occurrence not only on the County, for failing to seek and
212. The Court's affinity for retrogression reflects its view that the measure is
objective, clear and easy to administer. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983
(1996) (noting that "[n]on retrogression ... merely mandates that a minority's
opportunity to elect representatives of its choice not be diminished, directly or
indirectly, by the State's actions"); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 883-84 (1994)
(noting that "[t]here is little difficulty in discerning the two voting practices to
compare to determine whether retrogression would occur"); Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630,
655 (1993) (stating that "[a] reapportionment plan would not be narrowly tailored
to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the State went beyond what was reasonably
necessary to avoid retrogression"). The standard, however, is more malleable than
the Court has acknowledged. See, e.g., Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 97 (1997)
(holding nonretrogressive plan that reduces black-majority district from representing one-tenth of the State's congressional delegation to representing one-eleventh); Karlan, supra note 186, at 745-47 (arguing that Abrams' treatment of
retrogression makes no sense); see also supra note 186.
213. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 271-74 (1999). See supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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2 16
obtain preclearance of a viable plan, but also on the three-judge panel.
The Court explained that the panel, concerned that the election plans
proposed by the County and the resident voters conflicted "unnecessarily"
with state law, repeatedly instructed the parties to submit to it an election
plan that satisfied both section 5 and state law, and required them to do so
before the County submitted any plan to federal officials. "In so doing,"
the Court explained, "[the panel] interposed itself into the § 5 approval
process in a way that the statute does not contemplate."2 1 7 The Court
emphasized the "constrain[ed] . . . role"218 of the three-judge coverage
panel within the preclearance process, and that its goal is "to ensure that
fedthe covered jurisdiction submits its election plan to the appropriate
l9
eral authorities for preclearance as expeditiously as possible."
The Court's embrace of the consequent federalism costs in Lopez
might accordingly be reconciled with its rejection of them in the Bossier
Parish cases, given that all three decisions seek to restrict the discretion
exercised by a federal actor implementing the preclearance process, and
all three do so based on the perception that these actors have been operating in excess of their authority. Even so, the Court's displeasure with the
three-judge panel in Lopez pales in comparison to the profound disapproval it has expressed regarding what it sees as chronic and even inten-

tional misconduct by DOJ.22 0 The Court's mistrust of DOJ could not help

but inform its analysis in the Bossier Parish cases, while the perceived misconduct by the three-judge panel in Lopez seems a tangential concern and
thus an implausible explanation for the breadth of the holding.
Instead, Lopez may rest at bottom on what was missing as much as on
what was present. More specifically, the case, in contrast to the Bossier Parish decisions, did not directly implicate any conduct by DOJ, addressing
instead the coverage question over which DOJ has no authority. 2 2 1 Lopez
required the Court neither to review a specific decision made by DOJ nor
to confront the prospect that DOJ would implement the construction of
the statute adopted. To be sure, the consequence of the decision is to
render more conduct subject to preclearance and accordingly more conduct subject to review by DOJ, an odd result given the Court's mistrust of
DOJ. Still, Lopez postdates Bossier ParishI, and thus Lopez's coverage desig-

nation meant that the County would face a preclearance hurdle already
adjusted to mitigate overreaching by DOJ. 2 2 2 In Lopez, consequently, the
Court was able to construe section 5 broadly without directly confronting
216. Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 24 (1996) (noting County's failure to obtain preclearance and that "[t]he District Court itself holds some responsibility for protracting this litigation").
217. Id.
218. Id. at 23.
219. Id. at 24.
220. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 16.

222. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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concerns about DOJ abuse, and thereby to embrace the resulting federalism costs as a justified consequence of implementing congressional intent
in the VRA.
III.

CONCLUSION

Read separately, Lopez and the Bossier Parishcases set forth starkly different portraits of the VRA's preclearance process. Lopez broadly affirms
federal power to intrude deeply into sovereign state processes to vindicate
the voting rights of racial minorities. Congress is given wide latitude to do
so and deference is accorded both to its understanding of how best to
vindicate those rights and to the Attorney General, to whom Congress delegated enforcement authority. The Bossier Parish cases present a distinct
understanding of the preclearance process. The statute's intrusion into
state sovereignty is viewed with skepticism and broad constructions of the
statute are deemed to be of suspect constitutionality. The decisions suggest latent hostility to the creation of majority-minority districts and the
conception of minority rights they embody, and more overt distrust of
DOJ conduct in reviewing preclearance submissions.
Read together, the three decisions set forth a more complex portrait
of the Court's understanding of the preclearance process. While seemingly irreconcilable, the decisions may be read to establish the Court's underlying commitment to preclearance as a legitimate federal structure
enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, regardless of the
constraints the Court has recognized on Congress' ability to enforce those
amendments in other contexts. 223 The legitimacy of the federal structure,
however, does not diminish the Court's concern that those exercising
power within that structure have abused their authority and consequently
intruded unjustifiably into state sovereignty. The Court accordingly has
sought to curb federal power at the points where it has identified institutional overreaching.
To the extent that' DOJ or any federal agency acts in excess of its
delegated authority, the Court indeed should restrain the abuse. The Bossier Parish cases, however, do far more. By imposing narrow and strained
constructions on the statute, the decisions do not simply rein in agency
excesses but prohibit the agency from exercising the discretion Congress
delegated to it. Just as courts tend to accord too little deference to agency
judgments touching on constitutional questions, 224 the Court's desire
here to curb not only DOJ overreaching, but also opportunities for future
abuse undermines the federal regime and contravenes congressional design. Accordingly, the Court's effort to curb Executive Branch overreaching has produced a different type of institutional overreaching, this time
by the Court itself.
223. See supra note 6.
224. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 93, at 24546.

